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HYBRID ENERGY GOVERNANCE
Hari M. Osofsky*
Hannah J.Wiseman**

Energy law is substantively complex and deeply fragmented.
Each energy sector- including fuel extraction and pipelines, electricity generation and transmission, and transportation-has its own legal
regime and federalism approach. Confusion often exists at moments
of crisis about how much authority federal, state, and local regulators
have in these areas. The complexity and fragmentation of energy law
are particularlyproblematic because the energy system faces major
transitions due to emerging technology, more unpredictable and extreme weather events, and public pressurefor cleaner energy. Regulators struggle to: (1) manage the risks of hydraulic fracturing and
deepwater drilling, which are increasingly common in light of dwindling conventional oil and gas reserves; (2) upgrade our aging electricity grid; and (3) integrate renewable energy sources onto that grid
and into electricity markets.
This Article develops a novel theory of energy governance and
uses it to assess how institutional innovation can help meet critical
modern energy challenges. Building from our prior work arguingfor
a dynamic approach to energy federalism, this Article focuses on the
potential of institutionsthat are "hybrid" by virtue of includingpublic
and private actors from several governance levels and enabling important interactions among them. Grounding its approach in interdisciplinary governance theory, it argues that these institutions have
characteristics that could address structural barriers to substantive
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progress in energy law, such as inadequate, divided regulatory authority, and the complexities of including key private actors in energy
decision making. After introducingits new conceptual model, this Article examines several hybrid institutions with substantial regional
components that are working to address the three core substantive energy challenges identified here. It analyzes their progress in meeting
these challenges and how their hybrid governance approach is assisting them in doing so.
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INTRODUCTION

Except when crisis hits, energy consumers prefer not to "look behind the plug." We expect that the lights will turn on, gas stations will
have fuel for our cars, and our computers and iPads will charge. Energy

law reflects this understanding with its two fundamental mandates: reducing fuel and electricity costs and maintaining reliable service.
As becomes clear, however, when oil pours into the Gulf,' utilities

fail to restore power rapidly after major storms,2 or the lights go out during the Super Bowl,3 what lies behind the plug is extremely messy and

fragile. The energy system and the law that attempts to regulate it are
substantively and structurally complex. This complexity is particularly

problematic because the energy system faces a moment of major transition as regulators grapple with new technologies and public pressure for
"cleaner" energy.'

Specifically, they struggle to manage the risks of hy-

1. See Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Stopping the
Spill: The Five-Month Effort to Kill the Macondo Well (Staff Working Paper No. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.oilspiucommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents[Updated%20Containment%2Worki
ng%20Paper.pdf.
2.

See infra Part II; PJM, OPERATIONS UPDATE: HURRICANE SANDY, availableat http://www.

pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/20121126-webinar/20121126-reports-item-03bhurricane-sandy.ashx (2012) (noting "140 transmission lines out of service," forty offline generators,
approximately five million customers without service during the peak of the problems, and observing
that customer outages were "higher than both the 6/29/2012 Derecho and Hurricane Irene," while assessing the impacts of the hurricane and reporting preliminary data); Peter Applebome & Elizabeth
Maker, In Connecticut Replay, Storm Comes, Power Goes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at A12 (noting
that "losing trees and power has been common in Connecticut in recent storms"); Nate Schweber &
Jess Bidgood, Anxiety Grows as Thousands Remain Stranded and in the Dark After Storm, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/after-the-big-snowfafl-the-struggle-to-digout.html?pagewanted=all&_.r-0 (noting that at one point after the storm, 650,000 customers in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts were without power).
3. Ken Belson, Before Game is Decided, Superdome Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/sports/football/power-outage-in-superdome-delays-superbowl.html.
4. See Dennis Jacobe, Americans Want More Emphasis on Solar, Wind, Natural Gas, GALLUP
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161519/americans-emphasis-solar-wind-natural-gas.aspx;
Press Release, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., Energy Department, NREL Announce New Research
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draulic fracturing and deepwater drilling,' upgrade our aging electricity
grid, respond quickly to outages,6 and integrate renewable energy sources
onto that grid and into electricity markets.7
Energy federalism and governance are at the heart of this struggle.
Our prior article, Dynamic Energy Federalism, critiques both energy law
and the scholarship that analyzes it as deeply fragmented.8 Each primary
source of energy-coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydropower, solar, wind,
geothermal, and hydrokinetic - has its own legal regime. 9 Electricity,
pipelines, transmission systems, and transportation are addressed separately as well.1° This fragmentation is not simply substantive; the federalism arrangements within each sector are often inconsistent and unclear."
For example, natural gas pipeline construction is largely federalized,
while new electricity transmission generally must navigate state and local
land use planning. Moreover, confusion exists at critical momentsafter an accident or major weather event-about how much authority
federal, state, and local regulators have, which create's obstacles to effectively addressing substantive challenges. 3 We conclude Dynamic Energy
Federalism by arguing for a holistic, systematic approach to these federalism and governance challenges that: (1) establishes adequate regulatory authority, (2) reduces overlap and fragmentation, and (3) incorporates
key stakeholders appropriately.
This Article takes on the challenge of developing such an approach
and, in so doing, fills a key gap in energy law and federalism scholarship.
It proposes an innovative model of energy governance, using what it
terms "hybrid" institutions to address substantive energy challenges
more effectively. 5 Hybrid institutions combine authority from more than
one level of government, whether as a formal or informal part of their
structure or governance process, and also include private and public actors within the governance process. The Article specifically examines
hybrid institutions with strong regional components -either multistate
groupings from particular parts of the country or key stakeholders from a
particular part of a state. It argues that these regional institutions' unusual position between other governance levels -for example, at a level of
Center to Boost Clean Energy Technologies on a Smarter Grid (June 20, 2013), available at http://
www.nrel.gov/news/press/2013/2225.html.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 772
(2013).
9.

See id. at 802 (discussing "local, regional, federal and state regulations" that impact the types

of fuels used in electricity generation).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. at 803-06.
See, e.g., id. at 830.
Id. at 803, 805.
See, e.g., id. at 828.
See id. at 778.
See infra Part I.
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authority that is larger than states but smaller than federal-helps them
serve as important bridges between the key levels of authority in energy
regulation and take advantage of the many commonalities that geographic proximity brings. 6
Building from the conceptual model for hybrid energy governance it
proposes in Part II, this Article evaluates this governance form in action.
In Parts III through V, it provides detailed case studies of three sets of
innovative institutions, analyzing whether their hybrid, regional regulatory structures and approaches help them to make substantive progress
within an exceedingly complex energy system. Part III examines efforts
by the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) and Regional Citizen
Advisory Councils (RCACs) to reduce the risks of hydraulic fracturing
and deepwater drilling. Part IV considers initiatives by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and its regional entities to
maintain the reliability of the electricity grid as needed upgrades and
smart grid computerization take place. Part V analyzes initiatives by regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to integrate renewable energy
onto the physical grid and into energy markets. After an in-depth discussion of each set of institutions, the Article in Part V assesses the benefits
and limitations of hybrid, regional governance as a strategy for energy
transformation.
Through its model and case studies, this Article makes important
contributions to both the energy law and federalism literatures. Theoretically, it creates a new category for analysis-hybrid energy governance- and situates this category within a holistic understanding of energy federalism and governance. Its analytical approach provides a model
for how to translate dynamic energy federalism into needed institutional
development. Practically, these institutional innovations are already occurring in areas critical to the future of the energy system but have not
yet been analyzed in depth. This Article offers a needed assessment of
how these institutional forms emerge, what they are achieving, and the
benefits and limitations of their approach. This assessment could both
make these institutions more effective and serve as a basis for expanding
hybrid energy governance strategies into other contexts.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING HYBRID REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

This Part provides the conceptual grounding for the rest of the Article's detailed case studies. It first explores the need for institutional innovation to address the complex challenges facing the U.S. energy system. It focuses in particular on the governance challenges of inadequate
regulatory authority, fragmented regulatory authority, and integrating
key public and private stakeholders into the process appropriately. The
Part then draws from interdisciplinary governance theory to explain why
16.

See infra Part I.
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hybrid institutions, in theory, are a promising way to meet that need. It
proposes a model of hybridity designed to meet these governance challenges through (1) interaction across levels of government and the public
and private spheres; (2) regionalism, which forms a governance level between traditionally accepted levels, such as the local, state, and federal;
and (3) enhanced participatory mechanisms.
A.

The Need for InstitutionalInnovation

The energy system in the United States, which we mapped in Dynamic Energy Federalism," is never static. As that article describes in detail, this system consists of continuously interacting physical, market, and
regulatory dimensions. A complex physical infrastructure of generation,
sprawling transmission lines, and dense distribution networks delivers
electricity to consumers. A multilevel regulatory framework both forms
this physical structure and continuously remolds it, demanding or dampening new types of fuels and generation sources and requiring transmission upgrades for reliability and the accommodation of new generation.
The market, in turn, heavily influences fuel choice in electric generation
and decisions about where and when to build new infrastructure.18 All
three parts of the system-the physical, regulatory, and market components -experience constant fluctuation as relevant technology evolves, 19
electricity consumers demand change in the form of cleaner and more affordable technologies, 0 and policies shift accordingly.2
These interactions within the tripartite energy system involve numerous public and private stakeholders at multiple levels of government.
Understanding these interactions, and their implications for governance,
requires a dynamic, holistic model of energy federalism; such a model
both examines the nuances of interactions among and within levels of
17. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 780-807.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., John Hauer et al., Advanced Transmission Technologies, NAT'L TRANSMISSION
GRID STUDY, at F-4-F-5, F9 (2002), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/ntgs/issue-6.pdf. Hauer et al. describe technologies, like flexible AC transmission systems (FACTS) that "balance the load between"
certain lines and computer and communication devices called supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) and energy management system (EMS) technology, which provide better real-time data
about electricity being demanded from the grid and available electricity generation. All of these technologies allow the grid to be operated closer to its maximum limits (capacity), but as this occurs,
"knowing exactly where those limits are and how much operating margin remains becomes increasingly important." Id.
20. See, e.g., Jesse Broehl, Colorado Voters Pass Renewable Energy Standard, RENEWABLE
ENERGY WORLD (Nov. 3, 2004), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/200411/
colorado-voters-pass-renewable-energy-standard-17736; Anthony York, Voters Reject Prop. 23, Keeping California's Global Warming Law Intact [Updated], L.A. TIMES POLITICAL (Nov. 2, 2010, 11:17
PM),
http://latimesblogs.latines.com/california-politics/2010/11/voters-reject-prop-23-keeping-cali
fornias-global-warming-law-intact.html.
21. See, e.g., Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY (2013), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summary
maps/RPS-map.pdf (showing twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and two territories with
standards that require a certain percentage of electricity to come from renewable energy sources).
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government-local, state, national, international, and regional ones in
between. The model also considers how interactions in one part of the
energy system, such as regulatory efforts by regional institutions to expand transmission, relate to other parts of the system, such as transmission line owners' market-based opposition to sharing the costs of expansion."
This Section builds upon that approach to analyze how three specific governance concerns -inadequate jurisdictional authority, related
concerns of overlapping or fragmented authority, and heavy involvement
of private actors in energy governance -create the need for institutional
innovation. First, any institution tasked with balancing the physical, market, and regulatory aspects of the U.S. energy system will, if not carefully
designed, have inadequate authority. Because the system covers a wide
geographic area with areas of uneven demand-for instance, there is
concentrated energy use in population centers-it often implicates local,
state, regional, and federal concerns.13 Yet many processes either fail to
incorporate all of the key actors or fail to give them sufficient jurisdiction
over an energy problem. For example, regional transmission organizations (RTOs), which in many parts of the country govern the flow of
electricity through transmission lines and operate the lines, have some
authority to plan for needed interstate transmission line expansion, but
individual state and sometimes municipal governments retain jurisdiction
over siting. 4
Second, institutional arrangements that give actors inadequate authority over a problem also may produce both overlapping legal authority and fragmentation, leading to regulatory confusion at best and inaction or inappropriate action at worst. 5 Often, the lack of authority
described above results from separate regulatory entities having simultaneous control. Despite many entities controlling different aspects of a
problem, their jurisdiction combined is not sufficient to fully address the
energy challenge. The above-mentioned example of interstate transmission siting exemplifies this difficulty with RTOs, states, and sometimes
municipalities all having only a piece of the relevant authority. Challenges of fragmented and overlapping authority also arise in identifying
how much each region should have to pay for the costs of building new
interstate transmission lines-a process called cost allocation. As with
transmission siting, FERC is involved in shaping RTOs' planning for new
22. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 807-24.
23. See id. at 776 (explaining the complex array of actors implicated in power outages).
24. See id. at 801-07.
25. This challenge echoes the regulatory commons problem theorized by William Buzbee. This
problem typically arises when impacts like aquaculture or climate change cross jurisdictional boundaries, and multiple governments have some but not full responsibility for controlling the impacts. No
one government has adequate authority or incentive to address the entire problem, and this creates a
regulatory commons in which regulatory gaps occur. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1,22-26 (2003).
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transmission and efforts at cost allocation. 2 6 It issues federal orders and7
RTO-specific conditions for how RTOs may allocate costs, for example.
Yet individual states powerfully influence the cost allocation scheme ullike RTOs, lacks meaningful influence
timately agreed upon, and FERC,
28
in the siting of these new lines.
The simultaneous fragmentation and overlap obscures the gaps in
energy governance and complicates efforts to fully address problems, requiring each actor to fully understand the other's role and recent actions
taken and then to change its own approach either to avoid redundancy or
fill in gaps. This demands much of institutions already struggling to address their own complicated sphere of energy problems; expecting them
to further change their behaviors to accommodate deficiencies or apother actors may be too much to ask of resource-limited inproaches of
29
stitutions .
These problems of legal overlap and fragmentation also raise questions about how to structure the decision making hierarchy among the
many actors involved and about how cooperative the key actors are on a
particular energy issue. The multiplicity of actors within energy institutions-actors from many levels-can lead to competing hierarchies. For
example, in the context of deepwater drilling, even though a National
Contingency Plan ostensibly controlled the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, states and localities asserted jurisdiction in many
stages of the response efforts, 3 and subgroups of federal agencies made
decisions about closing fisheries and applying dispersants. 1 With respect
to interaction among the actors with partial authority to decide, the many
parties often cooperate at one point in time and conflict at other points.
For instance, states and municipalities may support an RTO decision to
expand a transmission line and even to site it within their jurisdiction, but
they may vehemently oppose the allocation of transmission line costs to
their utility customers.32
In a final structural governance challenge, private entities often play
an important role in the relevant publicly established institutional structure, which raises the potential for capture. For example, oil corporations, such as BP, are central players in spill responses, both because of
the National Contingency Plan structure that includes the responsible
company as a key participant in the planning and mitigation process for
spills and because of their expertise and control over site access. In the
contexts of electric reliability and the expansion of transmission lines,
26. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 803-05.
27. See id. at 805 (citing FERC Order No. 100-B (Order on Rehearing and Clarification, issued
Oct. 18,2012)).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 828.
31. See id. at 830.
32. See id. at 805-07.
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utilities are members of RTOs that plan for transmission; they also are
members of regional entities that propose and sometimes enforce reliability standards and have an important say in these organizations' decisions. These private entities play a crucial role in providing the technical
information and institutional knowledge necessary for these decisions.
Utilities may best know the real threat of cyber attacks, for example, and
thus the needed mechanisms to prevent such an attack, and they are
highly aware of transmission constraints and needed expansion. Despite
procedural safeguards against conflicts within these institutions, private
entities may sometimes have too much influence within a decision making process.33
Dynamic Energy Federalism,in addition to introducing these structural challenges and their interaction with the tripartite energy system,
proposes federalism principles for energy governance, which guide this
Article's institutional analysis and assessment. 4 Specifically, that article
argues that these institutions must: (1) create needed regulatory authority, (2) reduce fragmentation of regulatory authority, and (3) provide high
levels of involvement from key public and private stakeholders that allow
for meaningful input without capture. These principles call for creating
institutions that incorporate actors from all levels of government affected
by an energy issue, address overlap and fragmentation through defining
hierarchical relationships within these institutions, and better integrate
public and private stakeholders.
B.

The Potentialfor Hybridity to Help Ameliorate Governance
Challenges

To explore how to design institutions in line with these principles,
this Article analyzes three sets of institutions, each of which focuses on
one of the substantive challenges of core energy transformation outlined
in the Introduction: (1) improving risk governance in fuel extraction,
(2) maintaining grid reliability in the face of changing technology, and (3)
connecting more renewable energy sources to the grid. The institutions
described in Parts III through V, all of which have taken steps to foster
needed substantive change in the energy system, have also developed
mechanisms that begin to navigate the governance challenges described
in Dynamic Energy Federalism by incorporating the needed governance
strategies identified there. Namely, they help to constitute adequate authority over an energy issue, address regulatory overlap and fragmentation by defining hierarchies and encouraging better and more efficient
communication among actors at multiple governance levels, and include
key public and private stakeholders.

33.

See id. at 839-42.

34.

See id. at 778.
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These institutions have limitations, but three structural patterns
emerge as they incorporate some of these governance strategies. These
patterns may provide examples for broader paths forward in energy governance that comport with the principles discussed in the previous Section, and together, they form a model for hybrid energy governance.
First, all of the institutions are, at least in part, hybrids that combine
many key actors at different levels of government. To understand this
aspect of hybridity, it is useful to envision different governance levels as
residing along a vertical axis, from the sublocal to the international, and
actors within each governance level as occupying a horizontal axis (such
as state public utility commissioners acting together within an institution). Hybrid institutions vertically combine multiple levels of governance and require horizontal cooperation among a number of actors at
each level, including regulated utilities. These institutions also typically
include private actors either as voting members or in other participatory
forms that give them power to influence outcomes; they are therefore also hybrid in their combining of public and private interests.
Our conception of hybridity is informed by recent scholarship on legal pluralism focused on how to construct institutions that can manage
overlapping legal regimes and norms. Legal pluralism generally explores
situations in which more than one legal and/or normative order is present, including, for example, local or community-based norms for resource development and a regulatory regime that formally limits the
amount of resource that may be extracted. In the international law context in particular, global legal pluralism has created models for how this
multiplicity can be institutionally managed, which include some proposals for creating hybrid institutions.3" In addition, we build from complementary work by Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi on U.S. domestic administrative law exploring agency coordination in the face of pervasive
"overlapping and fragmented delegations."36
Throughout this Article's case analysis, we consider how institutional hybridity can help to coordinate among multiple public and private
orders within shared regulatory space. For instance, in the first context
of managing the risks of unconventional fuel extraction, Regional Citizens Advisory Councils (RCACs) allow for informal norms of communities, nongovernmental organizations, and corporations to be brought to35. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S.CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (analyzing a variety of pluralist models); see also Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The
Proposalfor a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (2001);
Elena A. Baylis, ParallelCourts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2007); William W.
Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963 (2004); Janet Koven Levit, A
Bottom-Up Approach to InternationalLawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30
YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005); Railf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of
Law, and the Challengefrom Global Legal Pluralism,51 WAYNE L. REv. 1209 (2005).
36. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordinationin Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012).

No. 1]

HYBRID ENERGY GOVERNANCE

gether with the government-driven regulatory process.37 Or, in our third
example of integrating renewables onto the electricity grid, RTOs can
help harmonize the state and local land use regimes that control transmission siting with larger-scale planning processes to build new transmission lines. 8
These hybrid institutions all have significant regional components,
which provide the second element of our governance model. These regional structures exist between two vertical governance levels (e.g., state
and federal), and they help to combine the partial authority at state and
federal levels to make meaningful progress. This regional structure also
pulls together multiple actors at one governance level (e.g., state); although this combining can lead to both cooperation and conflict, it enables governments to address energy issues that cross borders more effectively. This regional scaling creates a needed authority bridge between
levels of government.
Regional regulation within the United States is a well-established
means of drawing regulatory spaces between local, state, federal, and international authority. Broad literatures have emerged in both the law
and geography fields to describe and analyze this governance approach.
They consider the nature of the regional scale, its benefits and limitations, and how it interacts with other levels of government. 39 We draw
from this scholarship as we explore how the regional dimensions of these
institutions impact their regulatory role and capacity to address governance challenges.
Third, all of the institutions not only include both private and public
actors, but also provide for significant public and private stakeholder involvement in the regulatory process; they include utilities, energy companies, and other entities as voting members or key stakeholders. Although the mechanisms for input vary significantly across these entities,
they form an important component of the governance process in each instance.
Recent scholarship on new governance informs the Article's assessment of how hybrid structures can be designed to include stakeholders effectively and appropriately. New governance views regulation not
as solely top-down, public control by state and federal agencies with central authority, but rather as an ongoing and ever-changing relationshipoften one of negotiation and compromise -between agencies, regulated
entities, and other stakeholders. Professors Kenneth W. Abbot and
37.
38.
39.

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., 89 FERC 61,285 at 19-20; see discussion infra Part V.B.2.
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of

Multistate Renewable Energy Programsand Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771 (2010); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in InterstateAdjustment, 34

YALE L. J. 685, 696-98 (1925); Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism:Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2011).
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Duncan Snidal, for example, have contrasted new governance approaches with traditional ones as state-orchestrated instead of state-centered; as
decentralized instead of centralized; as drawing from dispersed expertise,
including business knowledge, instead of bureaucratic expertise; and as
combining hard and soft law, such as elements of industry-developed
standards, rather than focusing exclusively on mandatory rules.40 The institutions in the case examples have many of these qualities, which assist
their role in navigating federalism and governance challenges, as explored in the following Parts.
Together, legal pluralism, regionalism, and new governance help to
frame the model of hybrid energy governance proposed here: a model of
hybrid institutions that include both private and public actors from state,
local, and federal levels; that typically exist within a regional space between these governance levels; and that allow a number of stakeholders
to participate in decision making processes in meaningful ways. As explored in the Parts that follow, the combination of these approaches
within an institutional hybrid, paired with mechanisms to allow for flexibility, provide new insights. These Parts focus on examples of institutions that have followed this model as they address modern substantive
energy challenges, exploring how well these governance approaches
work when applied to real, complex energy problems.
III. ADDRESSING RISKS AND INEQUALITY IN UNCONVENTIONAL FUEL
DEVELOPMENT: REGIONAL STRUCTURES FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
As private actors develop new technologies41 to satisfy Americans'
enduring thirst for an unlimited and uninterrupted energy supply-and,
increasingly, a demand for domestic sources--onshore unconventional
oil and gas development42 and deepwater drilling43 have emerged as prev40. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
TransnationalNew Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
501, 508-09 (2009). For additional examples of new governance approaches, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in the Great Lakes Basin: Has Its Time Arrived?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1249, 1254-55 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 102-08 (2010).
41. Even technological progress in fuel extraction is far from purely private. The government
subsidizes the expensive technologies needed for unconventional development through tax exemptions and other mechanisms, and it also directly funds research-often public-private venturesthrough organizations like the National Energy Technology Laboratory. See, e.g., NAT'L ENERGY
TECH. LAB., OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
NATURAL GAS AND OIL RESEARCH

ANNOUNCES

NEW PARTNERSHIP

ON UNCONVENTIONAL

(Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2012/

120413_obama administration.html.
42. See, e.g., INTL. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 49, 75-76 (2012) (describing
rapidly growing U.S. shale gas and oil production, which might cause the United States to become a
net exporter of fuels); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECION AGENCY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO AIR
REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 2 (July 28, 2011), available at http://
www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728factsheet.pdf (explaining that approximately 11,400
new gas wells are fractured in the United States each year and that approximately 14,000 are refractured).
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alent technologies. These have introduced new risks and new environmental justice concerns, often in rural contexts, and have pushed at the
boundaries of existing energy governance. A focus on how to manage
these risks and fairness concerns effectively is critical because the pressures to augment domestic supply and achieve energy independence are
unlikely to decline. Even if we produced all of our fuel domestically, a
scenario that has become more realistic with recent technological advances, we could not avoid the inevitable echoes of a global fossil fuel
market" and would not be immune from price swings and certain ongoing trade disputes.45 This Part focuses on possibilities for governance innovation to address the governance concerns associated with expanding
domestic fuel extraction. It begins by exploring the substantive and regulatory problems arising in the context of fuel extraction and then turns to
an examination of hybrid, regional institutions working to address these
problems.
A.

Problems of Risk and Inequality in Fuel Extraction

The combination of drilling and hydraulic fracturing to extract gas
and oil from shale and other lower permeability formations (broadly described as shale gas and oil development), has expanded monumentally
in recent years,46 and specific fracturing technologies have changed. Energy companies have applied larger volumes of water and, in some cases,
43.

See, e.g., John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, U.S. in Accord With Mexico on Drilling,N.Y.

Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/world/americas/mexico-and-us-agree-on-oiland-gas-development-in-gulf.html (explaining that a U.S.-Mexican agreement on the regulation of
offshore drilling in the Gulf might open "more than a million acres to deepwater drilling").
44. See JOHNS. DUFFIELD, OVER A BARREL: THE COSTS OF U.S. FOREIGN OIL DEPENDENCE 27
(2008) (noting that even if the United States did not import any oil, our "economy could still be greatly affected by developments abroad" because of the linkage between domestically produced oil and
global markets-including global prices).
45. See id. Ultimately, regardless of where we produce oil and gas, these are global goods. If we
extract more here and rely less on imports, we might enjoy short-term energy security by avoiding the
need to intervene in foreign countries in order to secure current access to fuel. But if we remain concerned about price spikes, other countries' reliance on enemies' fuel sources, and the maintenance of a
relatively steady global supply of fossil fuel for our allies, expanded domestic production may do little
to change America's foreign policy stance and its interest in overseas supplies. That said, if we became
a net energy exporter, this would certainly give us more bargaining power in a number of disputes and
could potentially avoid some of the violent conflicts that have been associated, at least in part, with oil
and gas. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a PromisingDestination, 32
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 251 (2012). ("The shale gas boom will also have significant beneficial effects on geopolitical conditions by, for instance: reducing Russia's leverage over Europe due to Gazprom's dominance of the European gas market, reducing Iran's leverage over India due to India's
heavy reliance on energy supplies from Iran, and eliminating completely the risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be successful in his efforts to create a natural gas version of the OPEC cartel.").
46. See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 42, at 2; Hannah Wiseman, Risk and Response
in FracturingPolicy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 735 (2013), [hereinafter Risk and Response] (describing
how the number of fractured wells in Pennsylvania rose by more than three-hundred percent between
2008 and 2009); Hannah Wiseman, FracturingRegulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 361,
362-63 (2012) [hereinafter FracturingRegulation] (describing the first "slickwater" fracture treatment
in the Barnett Shale in the 1990s).
TIMES,
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new chemicals to wells -particularly in unconventional formations such
as shales and tight sands47 - to produce surprising quantities of domestic
natural gas and oil.48 While advances in drilling and hydraulic fracturing
in these formations have promised cheaper and abundant domestic supplies, they have introduced noticeable risks. Chemical spills, stored
wastes, and inadequately treated wastewaters can pollute surface or underground resources. 49 Improperly-constructed wells can send methane
into nearby water wells during the drilling process, 0 and overwithdrawals of water for fracturing can negatively impact stream flow.'
As more wells are drilled, habitats are fragmented, air pollutants increase, soil erodes and pollutes surface waters, and trucks damage
roads.2
Many of these risks are local. Air pollutants from drilling and fracturing may not drift far, and neighbors typically experience the brunt of
the noise and dust. 3 Others, however, have both local and regional impacts. Soil erosion, chemical spills, and improper storage and disposal of
wastewater can pollute waters shared by several states, and emissions of
greenhouse gases from drilling and processing equipment, wastewater,
and gas wells and pipelines have global effects.54
Regardless of the extent to which effects cross jurisdictional lines,
many citizens have objected to what they view as an unfair distribution of
47. See Fracturing Regulation, supra note 46, at 362-63 (explaining that different technologies
are used in slickwater fracturing of shales and tight sands, as compared to coalbed methane fracturing).
48. WHAT IS SHALE GAS AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
205.254.135.7/energy-in brief/about-shalegas.cfm (Dec. 5, 2012) (projecting "U.S. natural gas production to increase from 23.0 trillion cubic feet in 2011 to 33.1 trillion cubic feet in 2040, a 44% increase," nearly all of which will result from shale gas production); N.D. PETROLEUM COUNCIL, NORTH
DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES ANNUAL REPORT 3, 9-10 (2011), available at http://www.

ndoil.org/image/cache/NDPCAnnua1092111-2.pdf (showing record numbers of new well permits issued in recent years, which, as shown by the remainder of the report, is due largely to production of oil
from the Bakken Shale).
49. Despite the outpouring of attention to the potential for contamination of underground water
supplies, the majority of risks appear to arise at the surface based on incidents at shale gas and tight
sands sites so far. See generally Risk and Response, supra note 47, at 760 (characterizing the risks
based on state enforcement of environmental regulations at shale gas and tight sands sites); Fracturing
Regulation, supra note 47, at 361-67 (summarizing the risks and describing state enforcement actions
at well sites).
50. See Hannah J. Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing at 49-50 n.230 (June 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1953547 (describing gas migration incidents located through public records requests).
51. See N.Y. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL REVISED DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 6-2 (2011) (describing water withdrawal impacts), available at

http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials-minerals..pdf/rdsgeisch509ll.pdf;
note 5, at 71-72; FracturingRegulation, supra note 46, at 366.
52.

Wiseman & Gradijan, supra

For a summary of many of the risks, see generally Risk and Response, supra note 46, at 779-

82,794-96.
53. Id. at 796-97; David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of
Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 481 (2013) (observing that fracturing "can affect the air
quality, water quality, and visual aspects of the nearby environment").

54. For summaries of effects and their likely geographic distribution, see Spence, supra note 53,
at 480-81.
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burdens.5 Municipalities in New York,56 Pennsylvania, and other states
have banned hydraulic fracturing57 (with bans in Pennsylvania likely having only symbolic value58), and government officials have complained of
their inability to adequately influence the pace and location of development5 9 Around the country, neighbors of property owners who leased
mineral rights and allowed drilling and fracturing have sued, alleging
groundwater contamination and other health effects. 6° Some environmental groups" -indeed, even several states-have called for closer attention to risks, more precautionary regulation, and at least temporary
moratoria on fracturing.62 From a market perspective, others have questioned the federal government's continued subsidization of this practice,

55. See, e.g., Eliza Griswold, The Fracturingof Pennsylvania,N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Nov. 17,
2011), http:/www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-amwell-township.html?pagewanted=all
(describing some township residents' objections to fracturing and its impacts).
56. Pamela Chergotis, Highlandis the Latest Town to Ban Fracking,PIKE CNTY. COURIER, (July
12, 2012), http://pikecountycourier.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120712/NEwS01120719968/
Highland-is-the-latest-town-to-ban-fracking (describing four New York towns in the Delaware River
watershed that have banned fracturing); see also Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Dryden (N.Y. Sup.
2012); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield (N.Y. Sup. 2012) (validating bans); Longmont, Colorado, Charter, Article XVI, § 16.3, available at http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?
clientld=14590 (prohibiting hydraulic fracturing).
57. See supra note 56 (describing bans).
58. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(a) (b) (West 2012) (providing that "all local ordinances
regulating oil and gas operations shall allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources,"
shall allow well operations, may not impose conditions on oil and gas operations more stringent than
limitations on other industrial uses within the local jurisdiction, and "[s~hall authorize oil and gas operations ... as a permitted use in all zoning districts"). But see Robinson Twp v. Commonwealth, 52
A.3d 463, 480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (invalidating the preemption (under review; currently awaiting a
decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court)).
59. See, e.g., SAMUEL GALLAHER, BUECHNER INST. FOR GOVERNANCE, LOCAL, REGIONAL,
AND STATE GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING-RELATED OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT, Full Report, at iv, available at http://www.ucdenver.edulacademics/colleges/SPA/
Buechnerlnstitute/Research/natgasdev/library/Documents/Government%20Perspectives%20on %

200il%20and%20Gas%20Development%2OFull%2OReport%202013%2OGallaher.pdf (noting local
officials' concerns about road damage and about the adequacy of bonds for addressing local damage).
60. See, e.g., Berish v. Southwestern Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2011);
Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Co., 750, F. Supp. 2d 506,508 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
61. See, e.g., Risky Gas Drilling Threatens Health, Water Supplies, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/energy/gasdrilling/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); Lisa Sumi, Oil and Gas

Accountability Project, Our Drinking Water at Risk, (2005), available at http://www.earthworksaction.
org/files/publications/DrinkingWaterAtRisk.pdf.

62.

See Jim Efstathiou Jr., New Jersey Lawmakers Send Christie Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing,

BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-30/new-jersey-lawmakerssend-christie-ban-on-hydraulic-fracturing.html; Vermont First State to Ban Fracturing, CNN NEWS
(May 17, 2012), http://articles.enn.com/2012-05-17/us/us-vermont-fracking-l-fracking-shale-naturalgas?_s=PM:US; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENv'T, FACTS ABOUT... THE MARCELLUS SHALE SAFE
DRILLING INITIATIVE, http://www.mde.state.md.us/programs/Land/mining/Non%20Coal%2oMining/
Documents/ShaleEO-factsheet_061011.pdf (describing a three-part study in Maryland on fracturing
risks); Press Release, N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, NEW RECOMMENDATIONS ISSUED IN
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING REVIEW (June 30, 2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/75403.html (describing New York's extensive process to review the risks of shale gas development, after which "the Department will implement a system of oversight, monitoring and enforcement").
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arguing that it encourages and makes artificially cheap a damaging practice that already is common.63
Like shale gas and oil development, deepwater drilling and spills resulting from it take place at the outer boundaries of our technical capabilities and regulatory capacity and raise major concerns about the distribution of energy burdens. Technological developments have allowed
deepwater drilling to expand dramatically in the last decade, which has
brought with it the challenges of working at the high pressures and temperature differentials thousands of feet below the surface; some operations are now reaching oil as deep as 30,000 feet below the surface.,, The
need to control these operations remotely from the surface paired with
sometimes unstable geologic formations adds further complications.6"
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon spill reinforced these risks. It resulted in nearly five million barrels of oil spilling into the ocean, and containment efforts included usage of an unprecedented 1.8 million gallons
6
of dispersants, some of which were applied deeper than ever before. 1
Key governmental and corporate actors struggled to contain the spill and
accurately estimate the flow rate and volume of the spill, efforts that
were hampered by their regulatory and physical dynamics;6' these two
problems interacted as underestimation of the spill rate undercut containment efforts.8 The oil spilling out moved through currents and was
affected by storms in difficult to predict ways, with the complexity of addressing the spill reinforced by the poorly understood deepwater location
and dispersant use.69
63. But cf. Helen Cooper and Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks to End Subsidies for Oil and
Gas Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2012), http:l/www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/uslpoliticslobamacalls-for-an-end-to-subsidies-for-oil-and-gas-companies.html.
64. Temperatures are very cold at the seabed and very hot where the oil is located. See NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEPWATER: THE
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING- REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 48, 51

(2011),
http:/lwww.gpo.gov/fdsyslpkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf
[hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT].
65. See id. at 21, 41-43, 45-52, 90-100; Mark A. Latham, Five Thousand Feet and Below: The
Failureto Adequately Regulate Deepwater Oil Production Technology, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.

343,346-47,346 n.20 (2011).
66. See Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Stopping the
Spill: The Five-Month Effort to Kill the Macondo Well (Staff Working Paper No. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.oilspilicommission.gov/sites/default/files/documentsfUpdated%2OContainment%2Worki
ng%20Paper.pdf.; Nat'l Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, The
Use of Surface and Subsea Dispersants During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 1 (Staff Working

Paper No. 4, 2011). available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sitesldefault/files/documents/
Updated%20Dispersants%20Working%20Paper.pdf; One Year Later Press Pack, RESTORETHE
GULF.GOV (Apr. 10, 2011, 3:27 PM), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2011/04/10/one-year-laterpress-pack.
67. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 146-47; Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 12
(Staff Working Paper No. 2, 2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/documents/
Updated%20Unified %20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
68. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 64, at 129-71.
69. Id. at 174-75, 182; see also Christopher M. Reddy et al., Composition and Fate of Gas and Oil
Released to the Water Column During the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, PNAS, Early Edition July
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The spill deeply affected a range of communities and interests, from
luxury resorts to rural fishers to low-income communities of color, which
predominantly bore the burden of the waste in their municipal land
dumps.7 ° Moreover, the ongoing ecological and human impacts of the
1989 Exxon Valdez spill reinforce the impossibility of understanding the
full impacts of oil spills in their immediate aftermath, especially in the
less-pristine environment of the Gulf. After the spill, diverse stakeholders raised questions about the values and structures that should be included within drilling regulation and clean-up and compensation
schemes. Many political and corporate leaders argued for quickly resuming offshore drilling despite its risks-citing to jobs and economic benefits-while deeply-rooted fishing, environmental, and tourist-based interests demanded caution and improved regulatory oversight. States that
had resisted offshore drilling objected to the damage caused by a disaster
that they did not create, highlighting the complicated externalities that
can emerge from large, risky extraction projects. As with shale gas development, a number of actors also questioned the federal government's
continued subsidization of offshore unconventional drilling.7
In both instances, these substantive risks interact with the complexities of the energy system to create acute governance challenges. The underlying federalism arrangements in these two contexts are strikingly different, however. Much of the law applicable to hydraulic fracturing is
state-based-a confusing mix of common law property and statutory en72
vironmental and energy regulation -which raises serious issues for regionally-based operations and for the growth of this technique across the
United States. In contrast, deepwater drilling is regulated largely at a
federal level, but dynamics among federal agencies and between the federal entities and state and local government create difficulties.73
2011 at 1, available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/07/15/1101242108.full.pdf+html?withds=yes; Press Release, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Chemical Make-up of Gulf of Mexico

Plume Determined (July 18, 2011), http://www.nsf.gov/news/news-summ.jspcntn-id=120962&WT
.mc_id=USNSF_51&WT.mcev=click.
70. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63
FLA. L. REv. 1077, 1112 (2011) [hereinafter Multidimensional Governance] (citing Robert D. Bullard,
Voices: Environmental Justice Communities Bear Brunt of BP's Oil Spill Waste Disposal, THE
INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES (Apr. 23, 2011, 10:48 AM), http:// www.southernstudies.org/

2011/04/voices-environmental-justice-communities-bear-brunt-of-bps-oil-spill-waste-disposa.html)
(explaining that 42.3 percent of the waste went to communities that had majority people of color and
that 85.1 percent went to municipalities in which the percent of people of color in the community was
higher than the percentage in the county).
71.

For an in-depth discussion of these concerns, see NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER

HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note

1; Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 70; Hari M. Osofsky, Kate Baxter-Kauf, Bradley Hammer, Ann
Mailander, Brett Mares, Amy Pikovsky, Andrew Whitney & Laura Wilson, EnvironmentalJustice and
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 20 N.Y.U. ENvTL L.J. 99 (2012).
72. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in FracturedAppalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
229, 243-47 (2010) (describing some of the major federal exemptions, which largely leave states with
regulatory responsibilities).
73. For a detailed examination of federalism dynamics around deepwater drilling, see Multidimensional Governance,supra note 70.
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With respect to the shale gas and oil context in which hydraulic fracturing takes place, some of the effects of onshore drilling extend beyond
jurisdictional borders, thus creating concerns about inadequate authority
as well as fragmented and/or overlapping approaches to the issue. Drilling and fracturing rigs and other equipment at gas well sites can send air
emissions beyond local or potentially state borders and can have important cumulative effects, yet the Clean Air Act does not cover all of
these emissions.74 To fill this gap, some states are monitoring and regulating emissions at well sites; others are not." Furthermore, when well
operators send drilling and fracturing wastes to wastewater treatment
plants, inadequately treated wastes from these plants could pollute rivers
that run through multiple jurisdictions.7 ' The EPA has promised to develop wastewater treatment standards for these wastes, but these will not
be in place until 2014.77 in the meantime, regional river basin commissions have begun to address certain water quality problems; the Delaware River Basin Commission, for example, has proposed to require
Commission approval of shale gas waste disposal through wastewater
treatment plants.7 s Pennsylvania, in turn, has required treatment of shale
gas wastewater prior to its disposal through treatment plants, 79 and has
since requested that operators not send waste to any in-state treatment
plants."
The federal government, some states, and regional commissions
have attempted to regulate impacts on both air and water, but their simultaneous efforts leave gaps in authority; some harmful emissions may
74. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Proposed Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil and
Natural Gas Industry, Fact Sheet at 2, http://epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728factsheet.pdf
(noting air emissions, such as carbon monoxide, not regulated in the final rule); Oil and Natural Gas
Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, EPA-HO-OAR-2010-0505 (finalized Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/
airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417finalrule.pdf (regulating volatile organic compounds from wells).
75. See generally PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHCENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT (2011), available at http://www.dep.state.

pa.us/dep/deputateairwasteaqaqmdocsMarcellus_NCO05-06-11.pdf; Sampling Results Near Oil and
Natural Gas Facilities by County, TEx. COMM'N ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/
toxicology/barnettshale/samplingresults (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).
76. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Regional Administrator, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Michael
Krancer, Acting Secretary, Pennsylvania Dept. of Envtl. Protection (Mar. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region3/marcellus shale/PADEPMarcellusShale_- 030711.pdf (describing concerns about inadequately treated wastewater from shale gas wells).
77. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Schedule to Develop Natural Gas
Wastewater Standards (Oct. 20, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsflbd4379a92
ceceeac8525735900400c27/91e7fadb4b114c4a8525792f00542001 !OpenDocument.
78. Natural Gas Development Regulations, Del. River Basin Comm'n (proposed Nov. 8, 2011)
(implementing §§ 3.3, 3.6(b), 3.8, 4d, 5.2, 7.1, 13.1 and 14.2(a) of Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub.
L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961)), [hereinafter Revised Draft of Natural Gas Development Regulations], available at http://www.nj.gov/drbc/library/documents/naturalgas-REVISEDdraftregsllO8l
1.pdf.
79. 25 PA. CODE § 95.10(b) (2010).
80. Press Release, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Envtl. Protection, DEP Calls on
Natural Gas Drillers to Stop Giving Treatment Facilities Wastewater (Apr. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=%2017071 %20&typeid
=1.
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remain unchecked.8 Furthermore, as all of these different authorities attempt to partially respond to a bigger problem-the broader environmental impacts caused by the thousands of new wells drilled as a result of
advanced fracturing technologies8 -they may engage in overlapping,
fragmented regulation that could be more efficiently conducted by one
entity, such as a regional river authority or the EPA.
Deepwater drilling raises similar concerns despite a largely federally-based regime. Overlapping and incomplete authority, as well as issues
of how to appropriately incorporate public and private stakeholders,
arise both in offshore drilling regulation and in oil spill responses.8 3 For
example, in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) governing the response included numerous federal agencies, as well as state and local government representatives."' Even at the federal level, however, this effort to consolidate and
coordinate authority was incomplete. The Department of Energy was
not included within the group even though it was very involved in the
spill response. In addition, clusters of key agencies made decisions about
fisheries' closures and dispersants outside of the NCP process. Moreover, the multiple levels of government involved in the response often
added complexity. Governors early on claimed that the Stafford Act,
which would give states control over the response, applied rather than
the NCP. 86 Particular substantive issues where smaller scale governments
disagreed with the federal government also created conflict that made
centralized control difficult. For instance, the Coast Guard tried to create a systematic approach to the placement of boom-physical barriers
to the oil.y But states resisted those decisions, and used their own regulatory authority and funds given to them from BP to place boom in ways
that at times thwarted the Coast Guard's efforts to match barriers to the
greatest risks based on tidal currents. 8
Finally, effective regulation of both shale gas and oil development
and offshore drilling demands highly technical data. Authorities must
understand the complicated technologies used, the geologic conditions
encountered thousands of feet below ground or the ocean floor, 9 and the
composition of the wastes created, among a number of other details, in
81.

See Risk and Response, supra note 46, at 145 (describing proposed and finalized regulations).

82. For a discussion of the likely impacts, see id. at 125-26, 184.
83. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Multidimensional Governance, supra note 70,
at 1091,1096.
84. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 131.
85. See Decision-Making Within the Unified Command, supra note 67, at 8-9; Osofsky, supra
note 70, at 1095.
86. Osofsky, supra note 74, at 1092.
87. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 153.
88. See Decision-Making Within the Unified Command, supra note 67, at 17-20.
RESOURCE,
HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS: AN
UNCONVENTIONAL
89. See, e.g.,
UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES (2008), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/

contents/shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf (describing differences among the several types of shales and
tight sands drilled and fractured).
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order to identify and effectively address risks. Private actors possess
most of this information and therefore must be involved in the regulatory
process. Because many of these private actors are large, international
energy companies with sophisticated revolving-door relationships with
agencies and policy makers, the risk of capture is particularly high. In
the shale gas and oil context, for example, one of the major federal regulatory exemptions for hydraulic fracturing often is colloquially known as
the "Halliburton loophole"0 because of industry communications with
government actors prior to the passage of the exemption." Similarly, following the BP Oil Spill, numerous accounts of industry influence in the
well approval process showed that the Minerals Management Service cut
corners in environmental review92 - in large part due to industry pressure
to allow drilling to move forward quickly. This necessary but sometimes
problematic inclusion of private actors within governance addresses unconventional extraction risks and demands an innovative hybrid approach, as do the authority-based challenges. The following Sections discuss how institutions have begun to implement this approach and gauge
the success of these techniques in both addressing risk and overcoming
governance hurdles.
B.

Regulatory Innovation Through Hybrid Regional Structures

As discussed in Section III.A, demand in the United States for
cheap, domestic fuels has helped incentivize energy companies' increasing reliance on risky technologies to extract these fuels. Shale gas and oil
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, and offshore drilling, in particular, have
emerged as dominant extraction techniques. The failed BP well in the
Gulf of Mexico caused widely-dispersed pollution and sweeping economic and environmental damage, while the many stages of well development in shales have transformed communities and caused road damage,
surface spills, and local air quality and water use concerns, among many
other effects.93 As these technologies continue to expand, new mechanisms will be needed to control risk in a way that equitably distributes
the burdens of energy development; gives individuals, local, and state
governments some degree of control over the externalities of development; and incorporates a range of competing values from tourism and
natural resource-based industries that demand environmental protection
to rig workers who demand steady work.
This Section focuses on two institutions that have taken steps toward these goals while navigating the complexities of energy governance.
90. See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html?_r=0.
91. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas
Productionand the Need to Revisit Regulation,20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 181 (2009).
92.

See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 228.

93.

See supra Part II.A.
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Like most of the hybrid institutions described in this Article, these institutions emerged, or made substantial modifications to existing structures
or rules, in response to pressing energy challenges. In the context of shale
gas development, as energy companies leased minerals in anticipation of
drilling and fracturing in the Delaware River watershed,94 the DRBC, an
existing regional institution, proposed to expand its regulatory activities
to address drilling and fracturing within its watershed.95 RCACs, in turn,
serve as an important institutional response to oil spill risks, and they
emerged in response to a dramatic oil spill. The Section describes each
type of institution and explores how its unique structure drives its response to both substantive and structural challenges.
1.

IntroducingComprehensive Regulation and Expanding Stakeholder
Involvement to Prevent and Address Risk

The DRBC, established in 1961, was originally formed because of
growing legal disputes among states within the Delaware River watershed that culminated in a 1954 Supreme Court decision allocating certain
quantities of water to each state. 96 Rather than continuing to litigate water disputes, the states, with Congress's approval, entered into a compact
designed to address "demands upon the waters and related resources of
the basin," which were then expected to "mount rapidly" as a result of
rising population.'
The DRBC's recent regulations and proposals to expand RCACs
into the Gulf region for input both emerged as components of efforts to
rein in the risks of unconventional fossil fuel extraction through a more
comprehensive discussion of risk that involved diverse stakeholders. The
DRBC includes a representative from each state within the watershed, as
well as one federal representative from the Army Corps of Engineers.
Just as in 1961, the Commission faced growing population pressures and
associated water uses and pollution. The twenty-first century introduced
new threats to the river as energy companies began proposing to drill and
fracture thousands of wells in the region. 98 In response to rising concerns
that this activity would pollute the Delaware River, the Commission94. But cf. Complaint at 3 New York v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. CV11-2599
(E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2011) ("Promulgation of the DRBC Regulations is expected to result in the development of between 15,000 and 18,000 natural gas wells within the Basin ... ").
95. Revised Draft of Natural Gas Development Regulations, supra note 78.
96. New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 997 (1954) (authorizing diversions and appointing a
River Master); see CAROL R. COLLIER, THE DRBC: MANAGING INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS
THROUGH SOUND SCIENCE, ADAPTATION, AND COLLABORATION 1 (2004), available at http://www.

state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/FisheriesOpEd-July2004.pdf (noting that the Supreme Court decision "settled years of interstate conflict").
97. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328,75 Stat. 688 (1961).
98. See Revised Draft of Natural Gas Development Regulations, supra note 78 (concluding that
the regulations "are required for the immediate and long range use of the water resources of the Basin" and that "natural gas development projects may have a substantial effect on the water resources
of the Basin").
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which already had watershed-wide jurisdiction-proposed a sweeping set
of regulations to address nearly every stage of anticipated gas development within the watershed." Although old, the Commission took on a
daunting new task in writing comprehensive draft regulations in areas

that may push the boundaries of its jurisdiction. This effort has since
stalled, and the rules have not moved forward, but they may provide an
important foundation for future progress and examples for standards
should consider implementing while awaiting regional governthat states
100
ance.
The draft regulations, which the Commission proposed in 2010,
would constrain the number and location of gas sites within the watershed, require erosion and sedimentation controls at the sites, require
sites to comply with the strictest of two setback requirements (state or
regional) from water supplies, limit the quantity of water that may be
withdrawn for drilling and fracturing, detail the methods by which drilling and fracturing wastes may be disposed of, and require pre- and postdrill testing of water. 10 1 After publishing this long set of draft regulations,
the Commission solicited extensive stakeholder input and issued revised
regulations, 01 2 but it does not appear that the rules will be approved in the
near future. 3
The proposed regulations would address risks, as well as the equity
of risk distribution, in several important ways. First, by limiting the timing and quantity of water withdrawals for fracturing and preventing
withdrawals that would overly reduce stream flow,1" they would ensure
that discrete communities did not bear the brunt of water-based impacts;
depending on the surface water available, gas companies likely would
have to separate withdrawals over time and spatially in order to avoid
causing concentrated impacts in one area. Further, the regulations would
give citizens claiming contamination from drilling and fracturing a powerful causal tool that many currently lack: by requiring water quality surveys prior to drilling and fracturing, the regulations would establish base99. Id.
100. Id.; Press Release, Del. River Basin Comm'n; DRBC Postpones Vote on Draft Natural Gas
Regulations, (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/home/newsroom/news/approved/
20111007_newsrel-naturalgas.html (showing a stalled final vote, which did not later occur); "Fracking"
Proposal Currently Lacks Sufficient Health and Safety Protections, STATE OF DELAWARE (Nov. 17,
2011), http://news.delaware.gov/2011/11/17/drbc-fracking/ (showing a pledged vote of "no" on the
proposed regulations-a vote that then did not occur); State of N.Y. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 896 F.
Supp. 2d 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (addressing the State of New York's objection to the DRBC regulations-its argument that the proposed regulations required full National Environmental Policy Act
review-and finding a lack of standing); infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
101. Revised Draft of Natural Gas Development Regulations, supra note 78, at 47-84.
102.

Id.; Comments on Dec. 2010 Draft Natural Gas Regulations, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N,

http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/natural/draftregs-dec20l._comments.html.
103. See supra note 100; infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
104. Revised Draft of Natural Gas Development Regulations, supra note 78, at 52. In addition to
including minimum passby flow requirements, the regulations propose that a "withdrawal or diversion
must not have a significant adverse effect or interfere with upstream or downstream dischargers
...wetlands, or aquatic life." Id.
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line levels of pollutants from which post-drill pollution could be compared.' 5 Finally, by regulating most stages of the drilling and fracturing
process, the regulations better anticipate the many risks of development,
although they still omit several important stages.
In the offshore oil context, RCACs emerged in response to a much
more immediate threat than the potential for the drilling of new wells.
This regulatory hybrid occurred in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez
spill, and many have called for similar institutions in the Gulf region following the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. 101 One concern that arose after
the Exxon Valdez spill was the capacity for key stakeholders to have a
meaningful voice in the decision making process regarding oil tanker and
spill management. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,10° passed in response to
that spill, established a statutory basis for the creation of two RCACsone in the Prince William Sound region and the other in the Cook Inlet
region-and guidelines for their membership to ensure diverse representation of important constituencies. A settlement with the key corporate
actor Exxon funded these RCACs, adding a private component to this
governmental response)'0

The Cook Inlet RCAC, with thirteen members that represent local
governments, native groups, and other groups impacted by the 1989 oil
spill, has focused its efforts on improved spill prevention and response
for the Inlet, including monitoring waters for signs of pollution. 1°9 The
Prince William Sound RCAC, which has nineteen members, similarly
represents key constituencies that were impacted by the 1989 oil spill and
have an important stake in regional oil pollution prevention and marine

105.

Id. at 60 (requiring surface water testing prior to development).

106.

See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 1; Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning

from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater
Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,041,
11,045-46 (2010); Harlan Kirgan, Biloxi Beach Event to Callfor Citizen Group to Monitor Oil and Gas
Activities in Gulf of Mexico, GULFLIVE.COM (June 24, 2011, 6:56 AM), http://blog.gulflive.com/
mississippi-press-news/2011/06/biloxibeach-event.tocall-for.html.
107. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., and 46 U.S.C. (2012)).
108. Felicia Barnes, Regional Citizen Advisory Councils: Their Role in Oil Spill Prevention and
Response, 24 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 169,170 (2012); see Plater, supra note 106, at 11,046 (citing 33
U.S.C. § 2732(d)); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution-The Kepone Incident
and a Review of First Principles,29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 700-01 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The
Most Creative Moments in the Historyof Environmental Law: "The Whats," 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2223 (citing an E-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Bos. Coll. Law Sch., to William H. Rodgers, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law (Feb. 2, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review));
George J. Busenberg, Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils and Collaborative Environmental Management in the Marine Oil Trade of Alaska (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p-mla-apa-researchcitation/0/4/
6/7/pages4l678/p4l678-l.php
(studying the two advisory councils' impacts on policy change); About Us, COOK INLET REGIONAL
CITIZENS ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.circac.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=article
&id=l&Itemid=9 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) [hereinafter About Us, COOK]; About Us, PRINCE
WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.pwsrcac.org/about! (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) [hereinafter About Us, PRINCE].
109. About Us, COOK, supra note 108.
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protection."' In addition to its establishment through the OPA, the
Prince William Sound RCAC is governed by a contract with the Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company, which operates the trans-Alaska pipeline and
the Valdez terminal."' This contract provides funding so long as oil continues to flow through the pipeline (initially $2 million a year and currently $3.4 million a year), protects the
RCAC's independence, and pro112
vides it with particular responsibilities.
The work of these councils has included numerous environmental
and oil spill response research initiatives. For example, the Prince William Sound RCAC's responsibilities include: "review[ing], monitor[ing],
and comment[ing] on [Alyeska's] . . . oil spill prevention and response
plans, environmental protection capabilities, and actual and potential environmental impacts of terminal and tanker operations;" commenting on
and participating in "monitoring and assessment of environmental, social, and economic consequences of oil-transportation activities, including comments on the design of measures to mitigate the impacts of oil
spills and other environmental effects of terminal and tanker operations;" and increasing "public awareness of Alyeska's oil spill response,
spill prevention and environmental protection capabilities, as well as the
actual and potential environmental impacts of terminal and tanker operations."" 3
2.

Aggressive and Inclusive Regionalism

In taking first steps toward controlling the risk of unconventional oil
and gas development and of oil spills, the DRBC and RCACs have relied
primarily upon existing or newly formed regional structures. These regional approaches have helped these institutions navigate the horizontal
and vertical dimensions of the energy system by pulling together several
levels of government within a single decision making process and encouraging horizontal cooperation among actors residing at parallel jurisdictional levels, such as towns, states, and tribes.
In proposing a sweeping set of regulations to address fracturing and
drilling in its watershed, the DRBC has developed a new, heightened
form of regionalism, in which it would serve as arbiter among conflicting
state regulations, the filler of federal regulatory gaps, and the fixer of
risks of regional proportion. Specifically, it has proposed relatively stringent regulations that are, arguably, not directly rooted in a compact requirement. The Compact empowers the DRBC to "[e]stablish standards
of planning, design, and operation of all projects and facilities in the basin which affect its water resources, including without limitation, thereto,

110.

About Us, PRINCE, supra note 108.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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water and waste treatment plants"'1 4 and to "assume jurisdiction to control future pollution and abate existing pollution in the waters of the basin" after investigation and a public hearing. I" Several industry groups
have questioned the authority of the Commission to interpret its jurisdictional mandate so broadly, however."6
Despite lingering questions about the scope of DRBC authority and
the effectiveness of the draft regulations, the use of a regional forum to
control the risks of drilling and fracturing in the watershed may be a necessary tool for navigating the structural challenges of federalism in this
context. Entities within the Delaware River Basin operate in a complicated jurisdictional space: states and municipalities (to a very limited extent) have authority over land use, and the state controls certain water
withdrawals, the siting and drilling of oil and gas wells, and waste disposal practices for these wells." 7 In applying environmental regulations to
these wells and their wastes, states also must comply with some federal
laws; when well operators send wastes to a wastewater treatment plant,
for example, the federal Clean Water Act requires the plant to provide
assurances to its state permitting authority that it will be able to adequately treat these wastes.'18
The proposed authority of the DRBC over gas well permitting
would tread upon many of these local, state, and federal powers, and its
regulations both navigate these governance levels and establish a new
one for this context. Through its regulations, the institution explains that
compliance with state law will in some cases satisfy DRBC requirements
but lists the regional requirements that must be followed even in the
event of conflict; 119 it also highlights certain federal rules with which gas
companies must comply, such as conducting a natural resources inventory with endangered species studies before obtaining Commission approval to withdraw water.' 20 The regulations further call for a stateregional collaboration in carrying out the new requirements, enlisting
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1953).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Marcellus Shale Coalition, MSC: Draft DRBC Regulations Duplicative, Exceed
Body's Legal Authority, Apr. 13, 2011, http://marcelluscoalition.org/2011/04/msc-draft-drbcregulations-duplicative-exceed-body% E2 % 80%99s-legal-authority/.
117. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1953) ("WHEREAS, the water resources of the basin are
presently subject to the duplicating, overlapping and uncoordinated administration of some 43 state
agencies, 14 interstate agencies and 19 federal agencies which exercise a multiplicity of powers and
duties resulting in a splintering of authority and responsibilities .... "); New York's Role in the Delaware River Basin Commission, DEP'T ENVTL. CONS., http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/48454.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2013) (describing voting powers and the role of the individual state parties).
118. See Letter from Shawn Garvin, Regional Administrator, EPA, to Michael Krancer, Secre114.

tary,

PADEP

(May

12,

2011),

available at

http://www.epa.gov/region3/marcellus-shale/pdf/

letter/krancer-letter5-12-11.pdf (noting the need for certification to show that new wastes can be treated); cf, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1977) (requiring new pretreatment standards in order "to insure that any
source introducing pollutants into a publicly owned treatment works, which source would be a new
source subject to section 1316 of this title if it were to discharge pollutants, will not cause a violation of
the effluent limitations established for any such treatment works").
119. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, supra note 78, at 5.
120. Id. at 22.
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state agencies to implement all of the regional requirements for well construction and operation.'21 The DRBC itself would issue water withdrawal permits and approve plans for wastewater disposal, and it would
fund these new regulatory activities through various permitting and water withdrawal fees. Through this scheme, the DRBC relies on existing
regulations from several governance levels while inserting new, independent regional authority between these two levels.
Unlike the DRBC, which has long regional roots, RCACs are a
more recent regional innovation and have more diverse members, including key representatives of citizens and interest groups. Despite these differences, the Councils follow a similar path to the DRBC in navigating
governance levels while addressing unconventional fuel extraction risks.
As independent regional bodies, they comment on oil spill prevention
plans and drilling designs that are ultimately approved by the federal
government and also develop and provide direct monitoring and enforcement. Although the boards lack the formal regulatory authority enjoyed by the DRBC, many of their members wield considerable clout
and have the potential to both influence federally approved plans and
bring strategies learned in the regional forum back to their own governments. The Cook Inlet RCAC Board of Directors, for example, has thirteen members, including representatives of the cities of Anchorage, Kenai, Homer, Seldovia, and Kodiak, the Kodiak Island Borough and the
Kenai Peninsula Borough, and interest group representatives that include Alaska native organizations, its state chamber of commerce, environmental organizations, recreational groups, commercial fishing groups,
and aquaculture associations. The Board also has ten ex officio members
from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. EPA, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau
of Land Management, U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
NOAA, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Alaska
Department of Natural Resources, and Alaska Division of Homeland
Security & Emergency Management.122
The Prince William Sound RCAC has a similar membership configuration. Its bylaws establish nineteen voting members, which include villages and cities, as well as nongovernmental entities that represent Alas-3
1
ka Natives, conservation, tourism, commercial fishing, and aquaculture. 1
Specific members include: the Alaska State Chamber of Commerce,
Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Association, Chenega Bay,
Chugach Alaska Corporation, Cordova District Fishermen United, Kodiak Village Mayors Association, Oil Spill Region Environmental Coalition, Port Graham Corporation, Prince William Sound Aquaculture
121. Id. at 5 (noting that in accordance with the Compact, "the Commission will utilize and employ existing offices and rely upon agencies of the State of New York and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in their respective states in lieu of separately administering the construction and operation of individual natural gas wells and well pads").
122. Id.
123. About Us, PRINCE,supra note 108.
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Corporation, Tatitlek, the cities of Cordova, Homer, Kodiak, Seldovia,
Seward, Valdez, and Whitter, the Kenai Peninsula Borough, and the Kodiak Island Borough."4
By including a variety of locally-, regionally-, state-, and federallybased actors within a regional entity, the RCACs provide another important example of a hybrid institution that addresses a critical energy
governance challenge while navigating vertical and horizontal axes. Indeed, because these regional institutions were newly formed in response
to a specific concern, rather than emerging out of an old regional structure that did not anticipate the risks of unconventional development,
they may have more success than the DRBC in addressing potential conflicts among the many governance levels involved in the councils.
3.

Combining StakeholderInput and Regional Approaches to Navigate
Governance Challenges

Applying risky technologies to shales thousands of feet below dry
land or the ocean floor involves a massive industrial operation with risks
that could cross many jurisdictional boundaries. While incidents at
drilled and fractured wells have primarily had localized effects, aquifer
pollution from oil and gas wastes and air pollution can extend beyond the
well site. As the BP oil spill demonstrated, catastrophic events can have
national impacts, sending tarballs onto distant beaches and wastes to local landfills thousands of miles from the spill.'25
Activities with these types of broad impacts can create regulatory
voids over which no one entity asserts authority. In Pennsylvania, for
example-a DRBC member state in which gas drilling and fracturing has
boomed-the EPA worried that municipal treatment plants operating
under federal Clean Water Act permits were not adequately treating
fracturing wastes,'2 6 and the state, which was responsible for implementing the Act, initially resisted this claim. 127 Although the state has since
responded, it has in some cases encouraged out-of-state disposal, thus
potentially shifting the problem elsewhere rather than fully addressing
it. 2 8 The DRBC has proposed to fill this gap, at least for wells within its
124.

Member Entities,PRINCE, supra note 108.
125. See Brian Handwerk, BP Oil Spill's Sticky Remnants Wash Up Sporadically on Gulf Beaches,
NATL. GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 22, 2012, http:llnews.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/03/120322gulf-oil-spill-tar-balls-wash-up-on-beaches/.
126. See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Reg'l Adm'r, EPA Region III, to Michael Krancer, Acting Sec'y, Penn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/region3/marcellus
_shale/PADEPMarcellusShale_03071 1.pdf.
127. Letter from Michael Krancer, Acting Sec'y, Penn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., to Shawn M. Garvin,
Reg'l Adm'r, EPA Region III (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellusshale/ShawnGarvinLetter-April_6_201 1.pdf.
128.

See Deep Injection Wells: How Drilling Waste is Disposed Underground, STATE IMPACT

NPR, http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/tag/deep-injection-well/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013)
("Much of the frack water produced in Pennsylvania gets trucked to Ohio, which has more disposal
wells. Water can also be treated at private treatment facilities."). Note, however, that a larger percentage of wastewater is now reused within Pennsylvania. PENN STATE EXTENSION, MARCELLUS
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watershed, by requiring that gas companies obtain approval from the
Commission before disposing of wastes and demonstrate treatability.1 9
The DRBC, in writing regulations that may address inadequate authority and create interesting new hierarchies, also has strengthened the
bottom-up element of the regulatory process. In proposing a comprehensive new regulatory regime for one type of energy extraction, the
DRBC has gone to great lengths to incorporate stakeholder inputproviding a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, receiving and responding to more than 69,000 comments, holding three
public hearings at different locations, and delaying the release of draft
regulations in response to the outpouring of comments.' °
In addition to the specter of regulatory gaps in the area of unconventional shale gas, several levels of government may claim jurisdiction
over the problem, thus potentially creating overlapping and conflicting
policies or hierarchical disputes. In Pennsylvania, for example, municipalities have attempted to zone out drilling and fracturing or place strict
substantive limits on development activity despite state preemption. 3
Leaving most authority to the state provides regulatory uniformity and
predictability, but it may create gaps in regulation; enforcement officials
cannot be everywhere at once, and there is a risk-perhaps higher (or
lower) than at other governance levels-that capture by certain stakeholders will prevent or weaken certain needed regulations. Beyond municipal-state conflicts, regional and state authority over water withdrawals in Pennsylvania also has created confusing overlap. 32
The regional set of regulations proposed by the DRBC addresses
concerns about hierarchical conflicts and overlap. With respect to hierarchy, if the regulations are implemented, municipalities in the watershed may benefit from them despite lacking independent regulatory authority over gas drilling; they could advocate for strict implementation of
SHALE WASTEWATER ISSUES

IN PENNSYLVANIA -CURRENT

AND EMERGING TREATMENT AND

DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2011), available at http://cce.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/Natural

GasDev/DocumentsfPDFs/marcellus_wastewater fact sheet%5Bl%5D.pdf.
129. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, supra note 78, at 84.
130.

DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, supra note 78; Press Release, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N,

DRBC Postpones November 21 Special Meeting, (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.nj.gov/
drbc/home/newsroom/news/approved/20111118_newsrelnaturalgas.html.
131. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304 (2013) (preempting a variety of local regulations) (found unconstitutional by Robinson Tp. v. Pennsylvania., 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct.2012) (awaiting decision
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court)); Susan Phillips, Public Utility Commission Rejects Pittsburgh's
FrackingBan, STATE IMPACT NPR., (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:05 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/

201210911public-utility-commission-rejects-pittsburghs-fracking-ban (also discussing a PUC opinion
against one county's drilling regulations). Note that these opinions will not be fully resolved until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decides whether Pennsylvania's Act 13 is constitutional.
132. Cf. PENN STATE UNIVERSITY, MARCELLUS EDUCATION FACT SHEET: WATER
WITHDRAWALS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MARCELLUS SHALE GAS IN PENNSYLVANIA 4 (2010), availa-

ble at http://pubs.cas.psu.edu/FreePubs/pdfs/ua460.pdf ("Companies must obtain the necessary state
approvals as well as those of the applicable river basin commission. (In areas not covered by a river
basin commission, applications for well drilling and water management plans go entirely through
DEP.)").
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the regulations within their territory, for example. The regulations also
clarify regulatory overlap in water withdrawal approvals, although they
do not eliminate them. They provide, for example, that a gas company
proposing to withdraw water from a stream must obtain approval for its
water intake design from the Executive Director of the DRBC, the host
state, and several federal agencies.'33
The proposed regulations, although taking regionalism to a new
level through their detailed control of many risks, also have substantial
flaws. In an example of iterative cooperation and conflict not always
producing regulatory results, after participating in the drafting process,
Delaware announced that it would vote against the proposed revised
134
rules, citing the inadequacy of the rules for environmental protection.
New York, in turn, sued the federal representative on the DRBC and
other federal agencies, arguing for federal review of the regulations.'
Although the process was inclusive-eliciting more than 69,000 of stakeholder comments-a number of stakeholders similarly objected to the
adequacy of the final regulations. 3 6 In the meantime, other regional
commissions, such as the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, have
allowed drilling and fracturing within their watersheds with regulations
that tend to focus only on water withdrawals,'137 thus potentially subjecting certain areas to unfair levels of environmental burdens. This not-yetresolved conflict, which has resulted in less regulation of risks, suggests
that even institutions structurally positioned to bring stakeholders together may not be able to create consensus and achieve regulatory results.
Oil spills can create even more confusion, gaps and overlap, and
conflict in governance. For example, as noted above, when the Coast
Guard attempted to implement a comprehensive policy for placing oilcontaining boom on the ocean after the BP spill, states insisted on fol133. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, supra note 78, at 58.
134. See Susan Phillips, As Delaware Announces No Vote on DRBC Regulations, Monday's Meeting in Doubt, STATE IMPACT NPR, (Nov. 17, 2011, 7:14 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/
2011/11/17/as-delaware-sets-to-vote-no-on-drbc-regulations-mondays-meeting-in-doubt/.
135. Complaint at 1, New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. CV11-2599).
136. See, e.g., We Are on the Road to Victory! Delaware River Basin Commission Cancels Fracking
Vote!, RIVERKEEPER (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.riverkeeper.org/news-events/ncws/safeguard-

drinking-water/frackinggas-drilling/drbc-cancels-fracking-vote/.
137. SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM'N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2012), available
at http://www.srbc.net/programs/docs/NaturalGasFAQ-20120323_140574vl.pdf (noting that "SRBC
does not regulate the capture, storage, transport, treatment, recycling or disposal of frac fluid
wastewater-known as flowback-from natural gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing (hydrofracing)"
but that state agencies fill this role). Additionally, "SRBC's member states have the lead responsibility for regulating gas well drilling, including construction of drilling pads and access roads, water storage impoundments, well construction, and hydraulic fracturing (hydrofracing) .. ." Id. SRBC does
not directly regulate these activities; state agencies fill this role. Id. Consumptive water use "approval
specifics the maximum daily quantity of consumptive water use; metering, monitoring and reporting
requirements; daily monitoring of quantities; sources of water transported to and from the site; and the
fate of flowback and produced fluids in the first 30 days after hydraulic fracturing." Id.
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lowing their own boom placement programs.'38 This conflict was further
complicated by private actors' involvement in placing booms and implementing other spill response efforts. Many parties had stakes in the response, and the hierarchy of governance response was not always clear,
creating the threat of unnoticed gaps in response as well as unproductive
or conflicting overlap.'39 RCACs, which bring together private actors and
public entities from a range of governance levels to comment on spill response plans, could conceivably help to avoid these problems in the future.
Although existing RCACs are top-down in their creation (by federal statute), these institutions also allow for bottom-up input and action by
bringing together local, state, regional, tribal, and federal actors with
fragmented and potentially overlapping jurisdiction over oil spills. Their
participants include both public and private entities, and the Prince William RCAC has a contractual arrangement with a key corporation in the
region. 4 They thus constitute a regional, hybrid approach to governance
that helps important participants play a constructive role in a complex
regulatory process.
Assessments of the RCACs' work thus far both document their successes and indicate areas for improvement. Most promisingly, Professor
George Busenberg concludes that "the councils have operated as institutional learning arrangements (by promoting the application of new ideas
and information to policy decisions in this system)."'' Busenberg finds
that the differential funding of the two RCACs resulted in varying capacities, but that both councils have increased their ability to affect policy
reforms by collaborating with other institutions. 4 2 Zygmunt Plater recommends that other deficiencies in the RCACs need to be addressed,
however, both in these entities and in any others that are created; specifically, he highlights lack of subpoena power, the need to negotiate annual
funds with industry, and co-optation of council members as significant
barriers to RCAC effectiveness and independence.'43 Plater's critique
highlights the regulatory capture concern that arises with significant private involvement in these hybrid regulatory structures.
Although DRBC and RCACs operate in different contexts and diverge in their specific regulatory roles, they share in common the hybridi138. See Decision-Making Within the Unified Command, supra note 67, at 17.
139. See id.
140. See Busenberg, supra note 108, at 5.
141. Id. at 18-19.
142. See id. at 18-20.
143, See Plater, supra note 106, at 11,046. Plater's subsequent article that builds on this shorter
piece provides a more detailed analysis of citizens' councils, praising their accomplishments and analyzing challenges that they have faced. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the
Gulf of Mexico ...and the Hazards of "Megasystem CentripetalDi-Polarity," 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.

REV. 391, 409-15 (2011). For analysis of RCACs that summarizes the additional scholarly literature,
see Mackenzie M. Consoer, Risk Governance within Complex and Uncertain Environments: A Retrospective Analysis of the Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils in Alaska (May 8, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
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ty and regional focus that characterizes the institutional arrangements
analyzed in this Part. In both cases, their unique structure and positioning allows them to make some progress in addressing both the substantive and governance challenges discussed in Part I. They produce new
regulatory strategies for risk reduction that reflect significant input from
the people and entities that their approaches will affect. Despite these
accomplishments, though, neither entity has had unmitigated success. As
discussed further in Part VI's assessment of success, states' critiques of
the DRBC and Plater's RCAC concerns reflect genuine questions about
whether regulations are accomplishing enough and the extent to which
the RCACs' structure and process adequately prevents private capture.
IV. ENSURING

GRID RELIABILITY AS TECHNOLOGY CHANGES: THE

NERC EXAMPLE
As U.S. fuel extraction has dramatically changed and introduced
new challenges, our secondary energy system-comprised of electricity
generation, transmission, and distribution -also has experienced major
transformations.'" These changes have been particularly acute with respect to the choice of fuels for electricity generation and the need to update and maintain a complex, aging transmission grid, as well as to ensure that an increasingly digitized system of generation and transmission
is not compromised by cyber attacks.14' This Part focuses on these challenges and the possibilities for governance innovation to address them.
It begins by discussing the reliability challenges that arise as technology
changes and then analyzes ways in which NERC has implemented hybrid
governance strategies to address these issues.
A.

The Need to Update Grid Reliability Practicesas Technology
Changes

Three large regional mazes of wires form the U.S. grid, including
the Western, Texas, and Eastern Interconnects-with the Eastern and
Western Interconnects covering large portions of Southern Canada.'
144.

Cf AM. SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF

4 (2011), available at http://www.
asce.org/uploadedFilcs/lnfrastructurc/FailuretoAct/SCE41 %20report-Final-lores.pdf (noting improvements in energy infrastructure due to recent investments but noting the need for more investment "to further reduce the incidence of service disruptions" and the need to "adopt new technologies
and to meet the demands of a growing population and evolving economy over the next 30 years").
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE

145.

NAT'L. INST. STANDARDS & TECH., INTRODUCTION TO NISTR 7628 GUIDELINES FOR

SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY 3 (2010), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir7628_total.pdf ("While integrating information technologies is essential to building the Smart Grid
and realizing its benefits, the same networked technologies add complexity and also introduce new
interdependencies and vulnerabilities.").
146. See Learn More About Interconnections, OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY
RELIABILITY,
http://energy.gov/oc/rccovery-act/recovery-act-interconnection-transmission-planning/
learn-more-about-interconnections (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
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Within each of these three large networks of wires, which tend to be separated from each other due to historical grid development, regional institutions operate and maintain their portion of the interconnect.'47 If a
small failure occurs within any one of these interconnects, an entire region can experience severe power interruptions. 148 The reliability mandate faced by transmission operators in the United States and Canada
therefore imposes a seemingly impossible task: operators must provide a
good instantaneously to all consumers at the full quantity demanded
without interruption, all the while constantly balancing demand with the
149
quantity of generation available to ensure a steady voltage in the wires.
Seemingly benign incidents such as squirrels chewing through wires and
more classic interruptions from computer-based or physical sabotage of
the grid can cause massive system outages.
Smart grid initiatives at federal, state, and local levels-paired with
efforts to bring renewables onto the grid-have monumentally expanded
the difficulty of maintaining grid reliability. Policy makers and scholars
use the term "smart grid" in many different ways, but it generally refers
to the use of computers, greater interconnection among generators and
electricity users, and information flow to make the energy system more
efficient, reliable, and responsive. 5' Specifically, through smart grid efforts, transmission operators have begun to install computers to better
isolate certain distribution areas-thus preventing widespread black53
52
-and to relieve congestion at certain points within the grid.
outs"'
These operators also have expanded communications among grid users
and connected more grid components, allowing utilities to automatically
shut down certain large electricity users during periods of peak demand,
for example.'
In addition, as more renewable generators request grid
147.
148.

Id.
See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 2 (2002), available at

http://cnergy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/TransmissionGrid.pdf

(describing in-

stantaneous system-wide outages).
149. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 824-37.
150. See, e.g., Jon Mooallem, Squirrel Power!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/01/opinion/sunday/squirrel-power.html?_r=0 (cataloging reports of squirrels causing electricity
outages).
151.

See, e.g., S. Massoud Amin & Bruce F. Wollenberg, Toward a Smart Grid, IEEE POWER &

Sept./Oct. 2005, at 34 (explaining the term and proposing strategies for achieving
the goal of a smarter and more resilient grid).
ENERGY MAGAZINE,
152.

See, e.g., LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC'N, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 34, available at

http://cnergy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMcdia/DOE SG-BookSingle-Pages%281 %
29.pdf (describing the Beach Cities Microgrid, which will be able to "isolate from the utility scamlessly
with little or no disruption to the loads within it and scamlessly reconnect later," and to do so "during
a major grid disturbance").
153. See, e.g., Liz Enbysk, Transmission Upgrades Coming on Strong: Michigan the Latest with $90
Million for ABB Technology, SMART GRID NEWS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.smartgridnews.com/

artman/publish/Delivery-Transmission/Transmission-upgrades-coming-on-strong-Michigan-the-latestwith-90-million-for-ABB-technology-4501.html .UmyHz ksmPs (describing "dynamic voltage support" technologies deployed in Michigan to both improve regional reliability and accommodate wind
power).
154. See, e.g., Demand Response, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM'N http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/
wholesale/Ola cawholcsalc/MRTU/06_demandrcsponse.htm (last modified Dec. 9, 2008) (defining
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interconnections, utilities have begun to add new computer technologies
to the grid to allow for faster plug-in and coordination of electricity sup"' As a result of enhanced
ply. 55
interconnection, these operators and their
regulators also must address potential reliability concerns raised by introducing more intermittent sources.'56
On a smaller level, smart meters installed in homes, depending on
their level of intelligence, allow utilities to remotely control homes' airconditioning or heating systems, which again helps to create more load
and to avoid major spikes in demand.'57 Smart metering and real-time
pricing of electricity allow customers to better control their electricity use
by reducing demand during peak periods.'
These innovations can particularly benefit low-income customers-if they have access to the technology that is sometimes distributed inequitably, and if they have the
luxury of deciding when to use larger or smaller amounts of electricitygiving those most vulnerable to price changes in an inelastic good valuable control over use decisions. 5 9
The smart grid, which has enhanced the ability of intermittent renewable sources to connect to the grid and has introduced computers to
a number of other physical grid components, is an important transformation. Yet increased reliance on computers expands the opportunities
for grid sabotage and thus reliability failures; 1 ° indeed, China and other
real-time telemetry as "two-way real-time communication of energy usage"); Demand Response Regulation
Market,
PJM,
http://pjm.com/markets-and-operations/demand-response/dr-regulationmarket.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (describing participants who opt to allow very short-term changes in the quantity of electricity that flows to them in order to regulate "the stability of the power system" and explaining that these participants must have "real-time telemetry" capabilities).
155. See, e.g., ALSTOM, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES 2 (2011), available at
http://www.alstom.com/Globa/Grid/Resources/Documents/Integrating%2ORenewable%2
Energy%2
OSources.pdf (describing a "Renewable Operation Portal" that uses computer technology to, for example, respond "automatically to current power balance changes").
156. JIM BLATCHFORD, CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, CAISO PARTICIPATING INTERMITTENT
RESOURCE PROGRAM FOR WIND GENERATION 11, available at http://www.uwig.org/seattlefiles/

blatchford.pdf (explaining that "energy production [from wind] is unpredictable day ahead, hour
ahead, and from minute to minute"). See Part II.C for further discussion of intermittency.
157. See, e.g., Earn Bill Credits by Cycling Your Central AC, COMED, https://www.comed.com/
home-savings/rebates-incentives/pages/central-ac-cycling.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (describing
automated air-conditioner cycling using a wireless signal).
158. See, e.g., The Benefits of Smart Meters, CAL. PUBLIC UTILS. COMM'N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
PUC/energy/Demand+Response/benefits.htm (last modified Mar. 30, 2013) (noting that that smart
metering "provides customers with greater control over their electricity use when coupled with timebased rates, increasing the range of different pricing plans available to customers and giving them
more choice in managing their electricity consumption and bills"); Matthew L. Wald, 'Smart' Electric
Utility Meters, Intended to Create Savings, Instead Prompt Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/us/14meters.html (noting complaints about inaccurate meters and
the higher rates necessary to recoup the costs of installing the meters, as compared to the longer-term
payoffs in electricity use reductions). But see Rebecca Smith, Smart Meter, Dumb Idea?, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 27, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124050416142448555.html (noting the cost of installing
the metering infrastructure).
159. On the other hand, low-income customers may benefit the least from enhanced demand controls; even if they could program a dishwasher to run at midnight rather than 6 PM, they may not have
this luxury. A parent returning home from a third job at 11 PM needs clean dishes.
160. See, e.g., Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/oe/
technology-development/energy-delivery-systems-cybersecurity (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) ("Energy
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countries have hacked into U.S. utility computers .to warn them of their
abilities to interfere with the system. 61 In addition, greater information
flow enabled by the smart grid raises a host of privacy issues for consumers and businesses; smart grid data, if collected in the very granular form
that allows for fine-tuning of energy usage, can reveal the nuances of ap162
pliance use, including even which movie someone has chosen to watch.
As smart grid projects add more computers to transmission and distribution lines, the overarching mandate of reliability is threatened on
multiple fronts. Different reliability concerns affect different local utilities-and even states-in different ways. Certain areas face few hacking
threats, yet they are very concerned about technical failures of computers.'63 Because the grid is interconnected, a failure by any one entity to
adequately address its particular reliability concern would represent a
major gap in authority. Furthermore, even for areas facing similar reliability concerns, such as hacking, without coordinated governance, there
would be a threat that each utility or state would create a different reliability standard. These standards likely would have some elements in
common-thus creating potentially repetitive and inefficient regulatory
overlap, but they also could contain very different standards. This approach would create confusing, and potentially conflicting, requirements
for large utilities operating in several regions. Because utilities often are
regional or national in scope, demand for common standards could
emerge, leading to hierarchical conflicts among states or utilities as they
fought for the prioritization of their standards.
The early, national coordination of reliability standards through the
public-private reliability organization NERC has addressed many of
these governance problems that otherwise would have emerged in the
reliability context, as discussed in Part IV.C. below. The addition of federal (FERC) oversight of NERC in 2005 further coordinated the many
entities that write and enforce reliability standards under the NERC umbrella and clarified authority, with FERC having the power to approve or
reject new standards and to review all enforcements of reliability standdelivery systems include control systems, the brains that operate and monitor our energy infrastructure. Two examples of such systems are the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and
the Distributed Control Systems (DCS). Most early SCADA system designs did not anticipate the
security threats posed by the integration of advances in computers and communication such as off-theshelf software and operating systems, public telecommunication networks, and the Internet. Energy
delivery systems have become more productive and efficient, but the energy sector is faced with an
unprecedented challenge in protecting systems against cyber incidents and threats.").
161. Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html.
162. For a discussion of smart grid and privacy issues, see H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & Jonathan P.
Trotta, The Smart Grid: The Complexities and Importance of Data Privacy and Security, 19 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 297 (2011).
163. See discussion of cyber security issues and threats at N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,
RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE INTEGRATION OF SMART GRID, 69-80 (2010), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprodlDocumentsandMedia/SGTF-Report-Final.pdf; NAT'L. INST.
STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 145.
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ards. 164 This coordination still leaves room for confusion and possible hierarchical conflicts as new reliability standards are proposed, though.
Moreover, even with the benefits of this coordination, a third governance challenge emerges around potential regulatory capture. As evidenced by NERC's long history of private governance, industry involvement in regulating electric reliability is essential. Thousands of private
utilities own the bulk of generation and transmission 165 and understand
the highly technical aspects of connecting to and operating the grid, including, for example, maintaining a relatively constant voltage in the
wires despite fluctuating electricity generation and demand. Their participation in the formation and even the enforcement of the standards is
therefore key; FERC cannot be everywhere at one time to monitor the
behavior of each grid-connected entity, nor does it have all of the information necessary to write fully effective reliability standards. Yet leaving
the very entities that profit from electricity generation and grid operation
to write the standards necessary for grid reliability could be dangerous.
These entities might be tempted to cut corners when standards prove
particularly expensive.
These and other concerns introduce new challenges to a system of
grid reliability that has operated without public control for decades, forcing innovation within an already unique public-private governance
scheme. The following Section analyzes these developments and the extent to which they address substantive and structural challenges facing
grid reliability.
B.

Regulatory Innovation Through Hybrid Regional Structures

As utilities that operate transmission lines have struggled to keep
pace with the transition to a "smarter," more computerized grid with
greater integration of renewables, an old institution with a recently added federal governance structure has helped to maintain grid reliability
and security. This institution, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), has expanded and formalized a long-used privatepublic governance structure to help the grid adapt to change. The following Section explores how NERC's evolution has shaped its approach
to both substantive and structural aspects of this challenge.

164.
(2012),

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., ENSURING RELIABILITY OF THE BULK POWER SYSTEM 1
available at http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Documents/NERC%200ne%20Pager%20

DEC12.pdf (discussing NERC's progress in drafting new reliability standards).
165.

Mason Willrich, Electricity Transmission Policy for America: Enablinga Smart Grid, End-to-

End 7 (Energy Innovation, working Paper No. 09-003, 2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/
ipc/research/energy/pdf/EIP_09-003.pdf (noting in 2009 that IOUs "serve almost 75% of America's
electricity customers and that "[o]wnership of America's electric power industry is divided among
about 3100 separate entities").
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CoordinatingStandards Through Private Governanceand Adding
Public Oversight

Transmission operators first addressed the complex demands of grid
reliability through various private governance systems, which arose in response to pressing grid reliability concerns, including major blackouts. In
the 1960s, utilities across the country formed a committee to produce
"criteria and guides" for reliability operations, and certain regional
groups produced reliability guides.166 More serious coordination began in
1968, after "the largest blackout to date" occurred in 1965; following that
blackout, utilities created a more formal organization called the National
Electric Reliability Council, or NERC167 (now the North American Electric Reliability Corporation). NERC, whose members included transmission line owners, individual electricity users, and state regulatory commissions, among others, created eight subdivisions. These regional
entities (REs) proposed (and still do propose) reliability standards to
NERC and took core responsibility for enforcing them, as they also still
do. 161 These reliability standards require, for example, that utilities regularly trim vegetation around wires, identify critical cyber infrastructure
and how to secure it, and maintain "contingency reserve" generation to
back up failed generation. 16 9 REs enforce these standards by imposing
penalties on individual utility members, and NERC hears appeals from
utilities claiming unfair enforcement.17 °
Where RTOs and ISOs were formed to operate the grid and the
electricity and transmission services markets, regional entities were often
housed within them, but they had (and continue to have) separate mandates, with the RTO focusing on operations and the RE on maintaining
reliability. Where RTOs and ISOs have not been formed, the RE is an
independent quasi-private institution that answers to NERC and ensures
reliability within its portion of the grid.171
This complex system of private governance operated for four decades before the federal government intervened in 2005, adding a new
governance layer and forcing partial publicizing of NERC.12 This gov166. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., HISTORY OF NERC 2 (2012), available at http://www.
nerc.com/AboutNERC/Documents/History-Decl2.pdf.
167. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824e(4) (2006).
168. Compliance & Enforcement, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/pa/
comp/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) ("NERC relies on the Regional Entities to enforce
the NERC Reliability Standards with Bulk-Power System owners, operators, and users through approved regional delegation agreements.").
169. See Standards, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/pages/
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
170. Compliance & Enforcement,supra note 168 ("If resolution cannot be achieved at the regional level, NERC maintains an appeals process to hear disputes.").
171. For maps showing that regional entities and RTOs/ISOs do not always overlap, Regional
Entities, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers[Pages/
Regional-Entities.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013); ISO/RTO COUNCIL, ISO RTO OperatingRegions,
http://www.isorto.orglsite/c.jhKQIZPBImElb.26044711k.B14EMap.htm (last visited Oct. 27,2013).
172. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(b)-(c) (2005).
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ernance change once again occurred in response to a massive grid reliability failure-the "worst blackout ever" on August 14, 2003.173 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed FERC to approve an electric reliability
organization (ERO) to ensure grid reliability, and it gave FERC oversight authority. 7 4 Congress also required that reliability standards be
mandatory; FERC could directly enforce these standards, with fines up
to $1 million daily,
and would review all regional entity and NERC en1 75
forcement actions.
NERC subsequently applied to be the ERO and was approved by
FERC in 2006.176 NERC's mission, which is to ensure an adequate, uninterrupted supply of electricity throughout the United States and much of
Canada,1 77 remains the same despite the addition of this layer of federal
governance. To fulfill this mandate, NERC is to propose reliability
standards to FERC and enforce these mandatory standards; FERC can
reject or revise standards that it deems inadequate in addition to rejecting or revising NERC enforcement decisions-or conducting enforcement itself. 78 NERC continues to engage eight regional entities in both
the standard writing and enforcement process; indeed, like states sometimes do in a federal system, REs perform much of NERC's workproposing reliability standards and enforcing them.179 Canadian governments also individually have entered into memoranda of understandings
with the "new NERC" to confirm that it will continue to govern reliability within their provinces. 18°

Before and after its approval as the ERO for America and parts of
Canada, NERC has been relatively successful in proposing updated
standards to address new security issues inherent to the smart grid and
the interconnection of thousands of new renewable sources to the grid.
In developing a "Critical Cyber Asset Identification" standard, for example, NERC noted that "[b]usiness and operational demands for managing and maintaining a reliable Bulk Electric System increasingly rely
on Cyber Assets supporting critical reliability functions and processes to
communicate with each other, across functions and organizations, for
81
services and data" which enhances the risk of damage to these assets.

173.
174.

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 163.
16 U.S.C. § 824o(b)-(c).

175.
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., MILESTONES: NERC RELIABILITY STANDARDS 1 (2007),
availableat http://www.nerc.comlfiles/standardsmilestones.pdf.

176. Id.
177. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
178. Scott Grover, FERC Guidance Order Shows Inter-Agency Tension, 23 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T., 61, 61, 63 (2009) (describing FERC as "the final arbiter on the enforcement of reliability
standards").
179. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 163.
180. Id.
181. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., CYBER SECURITY-CRITICAL CYBER ASSET
IDENTIFICATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-002-4.pdf (last visited Aug. 24,
2013).
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Thus, while more computers are added to the grid to draw in more
generation sources, connect more portions of the grid to even out demand, and improve reliability, these additions can threaten the very reliability they aim to improve. To address this challenge, NERC has proposed and FERC has approved a variety of cyber-specific reliability
standards. 182 They require nearly all entities associated with the grid, including generators, transmission line operators, regional entities, regional
transmission organizations, and others to identify and list all of their
"critical cyber assets" associated with infrastructure that supports grid
reliability."l3
The standards further mandate that personnel with access to these
assets have special training and security awareness, 184 that entities associated with the grid implement security management controls for cyber assets, and that utilities develop a Cyber Security Incident Response
Plan,8 ' among other measures. NERC also is updating standards for grid
sabotage reporting in response to stakeholder requests for clarification of
the events that count as sabotage and comments on the difficulty of certain sabotage reporting. 86 One update includes a requirement that cybersecurity incidents be reported within an hour of the event having
been recognized. 187 Between 2008 and 2013, FERC and NERC have is18
sued more than 800 notices of penalty for cyber-related violations.
NERC, with the help of FERC, also has addressed new renewable interconnections- issuing thirteen notices of penalty for violations of facilitybased reliability standards at wind farms during this time period. 9
Major grid reliability challenges remain as renewable generators
continue to request interconnection and grid computer technologies expand, thus increasing cybersecurity threats. A recent Bloomberg survey
of fourteen utilities found, for example, that utilities "are able to prevent
[only] 69 percent of known cyber strikes against their systems."'" Furthermore, recent studies suggest that professional hackers hired by the
182.

See generally N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS TRANSITION

GUIDANCE

(2013),

available at

http://www.nerc.com/files/cyber._securitystandardstransition

guidance.pdf.
183. See generally N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 181.
184.

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., CYBER SECURITY-

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 1-2

(2011), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-004-4.pdf.
185.

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., CYBER SECURITY -SECURITY

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

1-2 (2011), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-003-4.pdf; N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,
CYBER SECURITY -INCIDENT

REPORTING AND

RESPONSE PLANNING,

1-2

(2011), available at

http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-008-4.pdf.
186. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP. STANDARD DEVELOPMENT TIMELINE 5 (2012), available
at http:/www.nerc.com/docs/standards/sar/EOP-004-2_redlinetoinitialballot_2012Apr24-Revl.pdf.

187.

Id. at 24.

188.

See Searchable Notice of Penalty Spreadsheet, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.

nerc.com/pa/comp/Pages/Enforcement-and-Mitigation.aspx (follow "For the Searchable Notice of
Penalty Spreadsheet click here" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
189. Id.
190.

Brian Wingfield, Power.Grid Cyber Attack Seen Leaving Millions in Dark for Months,

BLOOMBERG (Jan 31, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2012-02-01/cyber-attack-onu-s-power-grid-seen-leaving-millions-in-dark-for-monthshtml
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Chinese government have infiltrated numerous computers of energy utilities and pipelines, 9 ' and President Obama has issued a cybersecurity executive order in an attempt to fix stubborn challenges in this area.19
While substantial problems remain, NERC's historic and recently updated institutional approach to developing and enforcing reliability standards provides useful examples in navigating both structural and governance-specific challenges of an energy transformation.
2.

Horizontally and Vertically IntegratingKey Actors

Among energy institutions, NERC presents a unique hybrid form.
Although NERC itself is technically "private," it exhibits nearly all of the
typical elements of a public governance system: its board follows strict
bylaws for voting and membership procedures; it develops standards by
following the private procedural rules established by the American National Standards Institute;1 3 its standards are backed by the threat of high
penalties (now as high as $1 million daily), which it enforces; and it contains subentities (regional entities, or REs) that implement many of its
rule-writing and enforcement responsibilities. 94 NERC therefore resembles a private "national" government, which enlists "states" to implement its policies through a cooperative governance scheme. These statetype entities, however, are regional in nature; most REs are responsible
for maintaining reliability in several states and are governed by a board
of directors comprised of executives from each utility and other state
members within the RE's territory.'95
Following the addition of FERC's federal oversight to a onceprivate organization, NERC has largely maintained its private federalist
structure. Its Board of Trustees, which makes most final governance decisions, such as the approval of reliability standards before they are sent
to NERC, includes managing partners in private equity and other financial firms, senior executives of energy companies, former law firm partners, and former directors of municipally-owned utilities, among othThe Board of Trustees governs hundreds of entities, including
ers.'

191. See David E. Sanger et al., Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-tohacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing an early release of a report by Mandiant
that identifies the hacking problem but noting that "China's defense ministry has denied that it is responsible for initiating attacks").
192. Exec. Order No. 13,636,78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12,2013).
193. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 169.
194. Milestones:NERC Reliability Standards, supra note 175.
195. See, e.g., About FRCC, FL. RELIABILITY COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC., https://www.frcc.
com/AboutUs/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
196. Board of Trustees, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/gov/bot/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
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transmission line owners and operators, power marketers, and generators, among others. 197
The Board and Regional Entities do not operate on their own,
however. A "registered ballot body" consisting of utility representatives
and individuals votes and comments on proposed NERC standards, 198
and a committee of "sector representatives" directs the trustees' daily
operations-selecting the trustees and voting on their bylaws and budgets, for example. 199 Two sector representatives also participate in the
NERC Standards Committee, which "oversees the drafting of NERC reliability standards"; 2°° NERC's board of trustees ultimately approves or
rejects the standards following a vote by thousands of ballot members, as
described in more detail below. "[A]ny person or entity with an interest
in the reliable operation of the North American bulk power system" may
become a member of NERC 20 1 and may petition to be a sector representative. 201
Unique horizontal and vertical "governance" relationships are an
important part of the structure of this complex organization. Regional
entities pull together utilities from various states on their boards of directors. Utilities and public utility commissions from many states2 3 also horizontally interact within NERC's registered ballot body as they propose
and comment on reliability standards. Vertically, similar intertwining of
governance relationships emerges. As introduced in Part II, NERC has
an unusual number of governance layers, from individual members who
may propose reliability standards through regional entities, to NERC's
Board of Trustees (a national private entity), to FERC, which reviews
and approves or rejects proposed standards and enforcement actions.
Along both these vertical and horizontal axes, a mix of public and private
actors interact in a variety of complicated ways, as described in the following section.

197. N. AM.
(2013),

ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., APPENDIX 3D: REGISTERED BALLOT BODY CRITERIA
available at http://www.nerc.comlFilingsOrders/us/RuleOfProcedureDLiAppendix_3D-

BallotBodyCriteria__20140701.pdf (describing the many entities eligible to be in the Registered Ballot
Body); Registered Ballot Body, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., https://standards.nerc.net/rbb.aspx

(last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (listing the active members).
198. Key Players, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.comlAboutNERC/key
players/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
199. Member Representatives Committee (MRC), N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.
nerc.com/govfbotlMRC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27,2013).
200. Standards Committee (SC), N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/comm/
SC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
201.

Members, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.coin/gov/Pages/Members.aspx

(last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
202. Id.
203. RegisteredBallot Body, supra note 197.
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MaintainingPrivateInvolvement Within Shifting Hierarchical
Processes

NERC's standards development process perhaps best exemplifies
the specific governance interactions that add nuance to the vertical and
horizontal dimensions of grid governance. It demonstrates both bottomup and top-down hierarchies, and within these hierarchies, interesting
patterns of cooperation and conflict emerge, such as the development of
"consensus" and minority reliability standards that are proposed to
NERC's Board of Trustees? ° This process is also a powerful example of
public-private governance, with utilities, electricity users, and public utility commissioners all playing central roles in standards development.
Regarding hierarchy, the standards development process has maintained a grassroots theme despite the recent addition of a federal layer.
NERC writes both nationwide and regional reliability standards-all of
which are ultimately approved by FERC 0 ° The process for proposing
and approving both is similar, and the regional standard-writing process
for one regional entity2°6 is explored here as an example.
NERC allows "any member of NERC, including any member of a
regional reliability organizations, regional entity, or group within
NERC" or "any entity (person, organization, company, government
agency, individual, etc.) who is directly and materially affected by the reliability of the North American Bulk Power Systems" to request the "de2°7
velopment, modification, or withdrawal of a reliability standard."
Those entities requesting a regional standard in the territory of the regional entity apply to a regional entity committee that assigns drafting
responsibilities to a task force: the Standards Drafting Team.2° This
team posts a draft on the regional entity website and allows thirty days of
comments? °9 It then summarizes the comments, revises the standard ac2 10
cordingly, posts the revision, and schedules a vote by interested parties.
The team prepares a consensus draft following a vote on the standard,
along with a minority report for unresolved significant issues; this report
includes any appeals by interested parties who claim that the standard
violates the standards procedure manual.2 1
Voting segments for proposed regional reliability standards include
a public-private mix of interested parties from the transmission, genera204. See, e.g., SW. POWER POOL, SOUTHWEST POWER POOL REGIONAL ENTITY STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MANUAL 15-16 (2007), available at http://www.spp.org/publications/

SPP%20RE%2OStandards%20Development%2Process%2Manual.pdf.
205.

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., STANDARD PROCESSES MANUAL 12 (2013), available at

http://www.nerc.com/comm/sc/Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf.
206. Sw. POWER POOL, supra note 204.
207. Id. at 10. Other regional entities follow similar processes to the Southwest Power Pool's
Regional Entity's procedure for proposing reliability standards.
208. Id. at 13.
209. Id. at 14.
210. Id. at 14-15.
211. Id.atl 5-16.
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tion, power marketers/brokers, distribution/load serving entities, and end
user/public interest group sectors. 212 The Markets and Operations Policy
Committee (MOPC) reviews the recommended standard and makes an
213
advisory vote; it also may request revision or standard termination.
The regional entity's board of directors and members committee then
both review the standard, the results of the MOPC advisory vote, and
other relevant information and also provide an advisory vote on the proposed standard.2 14 The standard that emerges from this second advisory
vote goes to the regional entity trustees, which recommend that NERC
approve the standard, remand it "with comments or instructions," or
"determine that there is no need for the standard and terminate any future activity. '215 NERC's Board of Trustees then votes and sends its recommendation to FERC for approval. Figure 1 summarizes this bottomup initiated process.
FIGURE 1:
The Bottom-up NERC Process for the Development of Regional
Reliability Standards

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

15.
16.
16-17.
17.
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NERC's process for drafting national reliability standards is similar.
Any interested entity makes a request for a new, modified, or revised
standard to NERC's Standards Committee, which appoints a drafting
team.216 The team follows a similar notice, comment, and redrafting procedure, and the vote on the draft standards goes to NERC's full "Registered Ballot Body," which again consists of a unique public-private mix
of utilities, energy marketers, ISOs and RTOs, 21municipalities
that own
7
and operate utilities, state regulators, and others.
Although the standards development process exhibits a bottom-up
hierarchy, FERC has recently exerted more top-down authority within
NERC's enforcement process, making it clear that it will not simply rubber stamp enforcement decisions. In questioning the adequacy of a
number of penalties issued by NERC soon after its approval as the ERO,
for example, FERC in a Guidance Order made clear that "[a] monetary
penalty must be assessed and structured in such a way that a user, owner
or operator of the Bulk-Power System does not consider28 its imposition as
simply an economic choice or a cost of doing business."
In incorporating these many hybrid elements, NERC as an institution arguably embodies our proposed principles for energy governance.
It has used its authority to coordinate what could otherwise be a morass
of regulatory overlap. At the extreme, owners of transmission lines each
could have followed individual reliability standards, forcing every system
user to comply with different mandates; potentially, one generator sending electricity over several transmission lines could have faced three different standards with overlapping and/or divergent requirements. FERC
prevented this sort of "pancaking" (layering) in the transmission rate
context, but no such prohibition existed for reliability; it emerged organically.
In addition, NERC has prevented a potentially dangerous fragmentation of authority, in which some utilities ignored large system risks and
threatened the reliability of an entire portion of the grid. In combining
federal oversight with utility-led creation and enforcement of standards,
FERC also addresses several holes in authority. States lack jurisdiction
over wholesale transmission while the federal government lacks explicit
power over certain retail electricity transactions. Even failures in retail
distribution lines, however, can affect large portions of the grid, just as
flaws in the wholesale transmission system can cut off power for millions
of retail users. Congress, in granting FERC authority over all necessary
actions for reliability- even those involving retail distribution -has filled
216.

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CoRP., supra note 205, at 16,18.

217.

Registered Ballot Body, supra note 197.

218. See generally N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., DRAFTING TEAM GUIDELINES (2009).
available at http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/DocumentslNERCDraftingTeamGuidelines

EndorsedbySCApril2009.pdf; see also Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability
Standards, 18 C.F.R. pt. 39 (2006).
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in potential gaps in authority and coordinated that authority within one
institution. At the same time, it has retained the decentralized, private
process of standard writing that incorporates key private actors; those
most familiar with reliability challenges write the rules.
As with any complex governance system, the many layers of the
NERC process can cause problems. FERC's Director of the Office of
Electric Reliability, for example, has applauded the "public nature of the
reliability standards development process" '19 but has also noted its downfalls. Particularly in the cybersecurity area where new threats often
emerge quickly, the bottom-up, grassroots process can impede rapid response. Further, giving private actors such an important role in governance raises the classic concerns of the fox guarding the henhouse, although it also gives rulemaking authority to the entities with the most information in a highly technical field. With these benefits and limitations,
the NERC process provides a useful example of a hybrid regulatory
structure with regional dimensions creating needed dynamism.
V. INTEGRATING RENEWABLES ONTO THE GRID: EFFORTS BY
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
In addition to a better connected and more reliable transmission

grid, almost any model of needed energy transformation includes increasing the number of renewable generation sources on the grid.22 °
These sources require more than the enhanced interconnection potential
enabled by the smart grid. Their incorporation requires new transmission lines capable of handling these sources to be built to reach areas
with high electricity load, and a reworking of energy markets to handle
their intermittency. This Part focuses on the possibility for initiatives by
RTOs to meet these needs. It begins by considering the barriers facing
renewable integration onto the physical grid and into markets, and then
analyzes the hybrid, regional form of RTOs and the extent to which they
are overcoming these barriers through governance innovation.
A.

Challenges Facing the Integrationof Renewables onto the Grid

Renewables comprise a low percentage of the overall energy mix
right now, but the United States has massive untapped potential. For example, the abundant strip of wind resources running up the middle of the
country remains largely underutilized, as do areas off the coasts and in

219.
220.

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 215.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. JONES, STRATEGIES AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR

INTEGRATING VARIABLE ENERGY RESOURCES IN CONTROL CENTERS FOR RELIABLE GRID
OPERATIONS 1, 2, availableat http://www.eere.energy.gov/windpdfs/doe- windintegration-report.pdf

(summarizing studies addressing the integration of wind onto the grid).
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the Great Lakes.2 21 Similarly, the Southwest has extensive solar capacity
22
that is not being used to its full potential.
Once these renewables are connected to the grid, they can serve as
a source of cheaper, cleaner energy. For example, in the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) transmission system, which has man223
dates for reducing cost of transmission and enhancing reliability,
transmission operators have attempted to bring as much wind onto the
grid as possible because it is generally the cheapest available energy
source; 224 governmental incentive programs that help to reduce the infrastructure costs of installing wind turbines further reduce the price of
wind. 225 This cost minimization thus serves energy law goals of making
226
electricity affordable while assisting the transition to cleaner sources.
Despite their benefits, renewable energy resources have faced interconnection barriers. Existing transmission lines, based around major
power plants and population centers, do not reach new sites, and market
and regulatory barriers constrain the building of new ones. 2 1 Utilities often have little incentive to build new transmission that will encourage
competition from other generators, regulatory requirements for open access transmission can only go so far in forcing the construction of new
lines, and legitimate interconnection concerns and line constraints often
force renewable generators to wait in a transmission queue for months. 2m
In addition, both wind and solar are intermittent; wind speeds and
221.

See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030 (2008), available at http://www.

20percentwind.org/20percent-wind energy.report-revOctO8.pdf (describing as-yet unrealized potential); Utility-Scale Land-Based 80-Meter Wind Maps, U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, http://www.wind

poweringamerica.gov/wind-maps.asp (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).
222. See Billy Roberts, ConcentratingSolar Resource of the United States, NAT'L. RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/map-csp national-lo-res.jpg.

223. See, e.g., Press Release, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., MISO Board Approves 215
New Transmission Projects, (Dec. 8, 2011), available at https://www.misoenergy.org/About
Us/MediaCenter/PressReleases/Pages/MlSOBoardApproves2l5NewTransmissionProjects.aspx
(describing "a comprehensive long-term regional plan for the electric grid that will bring more than $2
billion in annual benefits for decades to come for energy consumers throughout the Midwest" and that
will help the RTO meet its reliability mandates).
IN

224. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/

aeo/pdf/electricity-generation.pdf (showing wind projects as costing 89.6 2011$/megawatt hour for
new plants entering service in 2018, as compared to conventional coal at 100.1 2011$/megawatt hour);
Jeff Kart, Renewables Cheaper than Coal, Michigan Regulators Say, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Feb.

24,
2012),
http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2012/02/24/michigan-regulators-say-renewablescheaper-than-coal/ (noting Michigan Public Service Commission figures, which estimate the average
cost of renewables at "$91.19 per megawatt hour, compared to $133 per megawatt hour for a new coal
plant").
225.

See 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, supranote 221, at 9.

226. Most states have a requirement that energy prices be "just and reasonable." See, e.g., 220
ILCS 5/9-101 (2013). FERC does the same for wholesale sales, although most wholesale sales are now
deregulated and are set by the market rate. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). Twenty-nine states also require that a certain percentage of electricity come from renewable sources. See DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, supra note 21.

227.
228.

See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 799.
See id. at 798.
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amounts of sunlight vary over time. 229 This intermittency causes barriers
to integrating them into the market, as the aging physical grid often cannot handle large quantities of variability, and traditional pricing systems
are not designed to handle these fluctuations.230 In addition, certain resources with which renewables are paired do not have the flexibility to
of power they provide to accommodate changrapidly vary the amount
231
ing wind patterns.
As in the previous two areas of substantive challenges in energy,
governance innovation paired with technological changes has the potential to help ameliorate these problems. For example, wind forecasting
technology has improved greatly, which allows for innovative regulatory
mechanisms to allow greater grid integration.232 This innovation also can
address the governance challenges inherent to a transmission system that
crosses local and state (and sometimes international) lines; demands realtime monitoring as well as long-term planning for electricity sources and
needs; and involves generators, line owners, utilities, state agencies,
FERC, and regional actors. FERC requirements for uniformofinterconthe pronection procedures233 give wind generators ex ante knowledge

cedures that will be required to receive approval from utilities or RTOs
to connect to transmission lines. Furthermore, innovative RTO proposals to require a variety of grid users to share the costs of building new
transmission-which often benefits a variety of generators and consumers, not just wind developers -increases the chances of new lines being
built. Section V.C explores how regional transmission organizations, in

229.

See

ELECTRICITY

DENHOLM ET AL., THE ROLE OF ENERGY STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE
GENERATION, NAT'L. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (2010), available at http://www.

PAUL

nrel.gov/docs/fyl0osti/47187.pdf ("Both solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind energy have variable and
uncertain (sometimes referred to as 'intermittent') output, which are unlike the dispatchable sources
used for the majority of electricity generation in the United States.").
230. Probability-Based Software for Grid Optimization, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://arpae.energy.gov/?q=arpa-e-projects/probability-based-software-grid-optimization (last visited Oct. 27,
2013) (explaining that "Sandia National Laboratories is working with several commercial and university partners to develop software for market management systems (MMSs) that enable greater use of
renewable energy sources throughout the grid" and that the intermittency of solar and wind introduces
"complications for MMSs, which have trouble accommodating the multiple sources of price and supply
uncertainties associated with bringing these new types of energy into the grid").
231. In Colorado, one industry-funded study suggests that carbon emissions increased following
the introduction of wind power as coal plants cycled up and down to accommodate this new influx of
variable energy. See BENTEK ENERGY, LLC, HOW LESS BECAME MORE: WIND, POWER AND
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN THE COLORADO ENERGY MARKET (2010), available at http://

westernenergyalliance.orglwp-content/uploads/BENTEK ExecutiveSummary%20_HowLessBecame
More.pdf. But see Lauren Valentino et al., System-Wide Emissions Implications of Increased Wind
Power Penetration,46 ENVTL. SCi. & TECH. 4200 (2012) (offering lower emissions numbers). While
the use of natural gas as a back-up resource is much more efficient, the barriers described in this paper, from long-term contracts to entrenched infrastructural investments, make it more difficult to rely
on the most efficient generation sources as complements to variable ones.
232.

Cf

Renewable Energy: Wind

Forecast Improvement Project, NAT'L. OCEANIC

&

http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/psd3/wfip/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
233. Interconnection for Wind Energy, Orger No. 661, 111 FERC 61,353 (2005) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
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particular, have made progress in overcoming governance challenges
while expanding transmission to renewable energy farms.
B. Regulatory Innovation Through Hybrid Regional Structures
As energy firms propose thousands of new renewable energy plants
in remote areas, the transmission grid faces unprecedented demands for
additional infrastructure construction and market integration. The grid
must substantially expand to accommodate a large portion of the proposed generation, and, as discussed in Section V.A, many existing utilities do not have the incentive to build out transmission to new, competing generators. This Section focuses on efforts by multistate RTOs in
states with high wind capacity-MISO and the Southwest Power Pool
(SPP)-to site transmission lines and integrate renewable energy into the
physical grid and market. It explores the extent to which their regulatory
innovations address both the substantive and structural issues described
in Part II.
1.

Implementing Creative PricingSchemes and PrioritizingRegional
Transmission Build-Out

RTOs emerged from FERC orders as part of its implementation of
the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 234 As with the other hybrid institutions
explored in this Article, RTOs were the result of an ongoing FERC response to a perceived crisis induced by technological and market-based
changes, although this crisis was not as discrete or seemingly immediate
as blackouts affecting grid reliability or threats of pollution from oil or
gas development.235 FERC Orders 888 and 889, followed later by Order
2000, specifically aimed to address an evolution that was then occurring
in electricity markets.236 In Order 888, FERC noted the movement toward independent and affiliated power producers, which often built
smaller generation units than did large utilities but needed access to the
transmission grid to sell their product.237 And following a 1978 act specifically aimed at encouraging the development of numerous small, efficient
generators and renewable generation units, transmission access became
even more essential to connect consumers with potentially cheaper and
cleaner power.23 8 Yet utilities that owned transmission lines created bottlenecks that made it difficult for these competitors to access the grid,
234. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
235. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 200, 89 FERC 1 61,285 (1999) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (in establishing guidelines for the approval of RTOs, noting that "the industry has
undergone sweeping restructuring activity" and "[t]rade in bulk power markets has continued to increase significantly," and that as a result of these and other changes, "the Nation's transmission grid is
being used heavily and in new ways").
236. Id.; Open-Access Same-Time Information System, Order No. 888, 75 FERC T 61,080 (1996)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Order no. 889 75 FERC 61,087 (1996) (codified at C.F.R. pt. 35).
237. Order No. 888,75 FERC 1 61,080.
238. Id.
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and FERC concluded in Order 888 that open access was necessary to adcompetitive pressures in the industry and rapidly
dress "the mounting
239
markets.
evolving
Beginning with Order 888, FERC fostered the creation of independent system operators, established an electronic information system
called the open access same-time information system (OASIS), and later
encouraged regional creation of RTOs.24 In Order 2000, FERC noted
that further "rapid growth" in technologies and the market had occurred
since orders 888 and 889.241 The opening of the market had fostered a
"rapid growth in dependence on wholesale markets for acquisition of
generation resources," and caused similarly "rapid development of new
generation resources. ''1 42 But "planning and construction of transmission
and transmission-related facilities" was apparently "not keeping up" with
the new demands placed on the grid by expanded generation and changing markets, and FERC concluded in Order 2000 that further encouragement of regional transmission entities, some of which had already
in order to ensure grid reliability and acformed voluntarily, was needed
2 43
commodate new generation.
Under Order 2000, RTOs must have independence from market
participants, regional scope of operations authority to plan and expand,
and an "open architecture policy" that allows for structural modifications. 44 Their minimum functions include tariff administration and design (the process of obtaining from FERC a regulated rate and approved
conditions for the transmission service provided), congestion management, OASIS participation, market monitoring, planning and expansion,
and interregional coordination. 245 As depicted in the following map,
there are currently 10 RTOs (some of which include not only U.S. states
but also Canadian provinces), which cover about two-thirds of the U.S.
population and about one-third of the Canadian population.

239. Id.
240. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 and 385); Open Access Same-Time
Information System (formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37); Regional Transmission Organizations, 65
Fed. Reg. 809 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel
Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the PublicInterest in the Governance and Accountability
of Regional Transmission Organizations,28 ENERGY L.J. 543,551-54 (2007).
241. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC 9 61,285 (1999) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
242. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 813.
243. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000,89 FERC 61,285 (1999).
244. Id.
245. Id.; see Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 240, at 551-54.
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MAP 1:
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The Midwestern RTO, MISO, has been particularly active in addressing renewable challenges as a result of burgeoning interconnection
requests from wind generators in the region. In December 2001, MISO
became the first RTO approved by FERC. 2 7 As of the 2011 ISO/RTO
metrics report, it included 33 transmission owners with approximately
57,000 miles of transmission lines and generation owners with 148,456
megawatts of electrical generation. 248 It covers twelve U.S. states and the
Canadian province of Manitoba, and in 2010, cleared more than $25.7
billion in energy transactions. 49 MISO includes states that have among
the highest wind capacity in the United States and was among the first
RTOs to proactively include wind in its transmission planning process,
beginning in 2003, through its Midwest ISO Transmission Expansion
Plan and continuing in all of its transmission planning since.2 °
As Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have discussed in recent
scholarship, MISO's Multi-Value Project pricing approach has the poten246.

Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) / Independent System Operators (ISO), FED.

ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updat-

ed Oct. 17, 2013).
247.

CAL, INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP. ET AL., 2011 ISO/RTO METRICS REPORT 145 (2011),

available at https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/TarifffFERC%20Filings/2011-08-31%
20Docket %2ONo. %20AD10-5-000.pdf.
248. Id.
249. The MISO states include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wisconsin, and parts of Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Ohio. Electric Power Markets:
Midwest (MISO), FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-

electric/midwest.asp (last updated Oct. 11, 2013).
250.

CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP. ET AL., supra note 247, at 158, 160.
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tial to help overcome cost allocation barriers to new transmission lines
that will help bring renewable energy onto the grid and assist its states in
meeting their renewable energy goals. 251 The MVP model introduces a
new pricing scheme in which the amount of load on the new lines will affect the price that an area within the region pays.2 2 Projects that meet
certain requirements, such as participating in MISO's transmission expansion planning process, "provid[ing] multiple economic benefits," and
addressing regional reliability standards, may participate.2 3 The MVP
approach has thus far survived challenges by those who oppose it-the
Seventh Circuit upheld the plan in June 2013-and it represents a promising effort
to integrate renewables more effectively into the physical
25 4
grid.
Indeed, MISO's approaches to transmission governance have correlated with tangible gains on needed energy transformation. For example,
a 2007 study by the ISO/RTO council indicated that RTOs help to implement renewable portfolio standards by tracking generation, and that
ISOs and RTOs support markets' integration of renewable resources. It
noted that at that time, ISOs and RTOs hosted 79% of installed wind
generation, "which is well above their 44% share of wind energy poten'255
tial and 53% share of total North American electricity demand.
While this disproportionate share is likely due in part to RTOs' fortuitous concentration in the Midwest, which has abundant wind, RTOs likely have directly supported enhanced investment in renewable generation,
at least in part.
In addition to this work on transmission, MISO's new resource designation of Dispatchable Intermittent Resources (DIRs) is allowing wind
energy to participate fully in the real-time markets rather than just the
day ahead ones for the first time. 2 6 This innovative approach to bringing

251.

Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable

Energy: A FederalismMismatch, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1801, 1870-71 (2012).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1852.
254. See I11.
Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.
2013). For a discussion of how the MISO plan that was upheld was structured somewhat differently
than a regional plan by another RTO that the Seventh Circuit struck down, see Klass & Wilson, supra
note 251, at 1854.
255. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, INCREASING RENEWABLE RESOURCES: How ISOs AND RTOs ARE
HELPING MEET THIS PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVE ES-1-2 (2007), available at http://www.isorto.org/

atf/cf/%7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD%7D/IRCRENEWABLESREPORT
_101607_FINAL.pdf.
256. Press Release, MISO, Miso Furthers Wind Integration into Market (June 1, 2011), available at
https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/MediaCenter/PressReleases/Pages/MlSOFurtherslntegrationof
WindResources.aspx; see also generally MISO, DISPATCHABLE INTERMITTENT RESOURCE
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (2011), available at https://www.misoenergy.org/LibraryfRepository[Report/

DIR%201mplementation%20Guide.pdf. For a discussion of integrating intermittent renewable resources into energy markets, see Walter R. Hall II, et al., American Bar Association Energy and Resources Committees, Restructuringof the Electric Industry, 2008 ABA ENVTL. ENERGY & RESOURCES
L.: YEAR IN REV. 296; Audun Botterud et al., Wind Power Forecastingin U.S. Electricity Markets, 23

ELECTRICITY J. 71 (2010); J.C. Smith et al., Impact of Variable Renewable Energy on US Electricity
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wind more fully into the market, using improved wind prediction technology, has the potential to limit wind curtailment and pave the way for
even more integration in the future. For example, MISO is not yet allowing DIRs to supply operating reserves, but has expressed its openness
to doing so in the future after this experiment. 57 While controversy remains over some of the particulars, MISO's pricing efforts, like its transmission activities, represent important steps forward in integrating renewable energy into the market dimensions of the grid.
Other RTOs have begun to make similar progress in expanding
transmission to renewables. The Southwest Power Pool (SPP), an RTO
that covers 255,000 square miles in Oklahoma, Kansas, the Texas Panhandle, and parts of New Mexico, Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana, 258
also operates within a very windy region. Although it has not been as
aggressive as MISO in expanding transmission for wind power, it has
taken important planning steps. In 2004 alone, SPP had 37 interconnection requests from generators in process, including 26 requests from wind
259
generators.
To address anticipated future interconnection requests and a number of other impending transmission challenges, SPP conducts both local
and regional planning to operate and continuously update its grid effectively. For example, SPP initiated a process to plan for a "cohesive
group of economic transmission upgrades" benefitting the region and to
determine how to allocate the costs of upgrades regionally.2? Two additional local area planning processes created a plan to build an "extra high
voltage transmission backbone" across the region and to annually review
"transmission expansion needs over a 10-year horizon" to determine how
grid reliability would be maintained.26'
In 2009, SPP announced that it would pull together these transmission planning processes into one process called the Integrated Transmission Plan, which addresses the need to maintain grid reliability and allow
for economic development through the interconnection of new generation, including wind. 2 2 When this plan is implemented, it will "result in a

Markets (draft manuscript on file with authors); Li Zhanget et al., Generationand Demand Management Improvement with Increased VariableGeneration:A Midwest ISO Perspective, IEEE (2011).
257. See Order Conditionally Accepting in Part and Rejecting in Part Tariff Filing and Requiring
Compliance Filings, 134 FERC 61,141 (Feb. 28, 2011); Order Denying Rehearing, 136 FERC
61,100 (Aug. 12,2011).
258. ISOJRTO PLANNING COMM., ISO/RTO ELECTRIC SYSTEM PLANNING: CURRENT
PRACTICES, EXPANSION PLANS, AND PLANNING ISSUES 156 (2006), available at http://www.ercot.
com/news/presentations/2006/IRC_PCPlanningReportFinal02 06_06.pdf.
259. Id. at 159.
260. Sw.POWER POOL, INTEGRATED TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESS DOCUMENT 6 (2009),
availableat http://www.spp.org/publications/itp-process-final_20091029.pdf.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 3, 6 (describing the purpose, noting that study assumptions will include "wind profiles,"
and noting that the new ITP process must capture the goals of each planning process integrated into
the larger process, including the goal of "utilization of the area's large renewable resources").

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2014

list of transmission expansion projects and completion dates. '26 3 The
RTO has already completed a cost allocation strategy to distribute more
costs of grid upgrades for wind throughout the region.26 It has also
joined a larger regional group, which covers the entire grid that services
the eastern United States (the Eastern Interconnection Planning Collab265
orative), to "focus on interconnection-wide expansion plans" for wind.
Beyond planning for transmission expansions, SPP must accommodate interconnection requests that it already has received. It initially did
this by evaluating specific interconnection requests from generators;
when SPP received a large number of wind generation requests, however, it began aggregating them within "cluster studies. ' '26 These showed
that new extra high voltage facilities (EHV) would be required and that
some of these upgrades were not included within the planned transmission backbone."' SPP therefore formed a separate technical planning
process, which creates a model with various assumptions about the
amount and type of new generation that will come online within the region (including high wind scenarios, for example), economic needs, and
reliability.
While no entity can fully address the challenge of rapidly growing
renewable generation and interconnection requests, the structure and
functions of RTOs have improved renewable access. As the RTO/ISO
planning committee noted in 2006: "The ISOs/RTOs have been successful in creating nondiscriminatory, open, and transparent electric system
planning and expansion planning processes that provide an opportunity
for all stakeholders to participate. The ISO/RTO planning processes
remain dynamic and are still evolving. "268
2. ForgingHorizontal and Vertical Connections
RTOs, by bringing together utilities, state utility commissioners, and
disinterested experts in the governance of transmission planning and operation, forge needed interactions among the many parties affected by
the grid. Professor Michael Dworkin provides a useful framework
through which we might structurally characterize RTOs, alternatively
understanding them as: (1) agents of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission; (2) monopolies, private entities that need regulation like
other monopolies in the energy market; (3) hybrid, quasi-governmental
organizations, (4) a commodities trading market; (5) agents of transmis263.

Id. at 4.

SW. POWER POOL, WIND INTEGRATION 1 (2010), available at http://www.spp.org/
publications/SPP WindIntegrationQA.pdf.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Sw. POWER POOL, supra note 260, at 6; for generation request data, see ISOJRTO PLANNING
264.

COMM., supra note 258, at 159.

267.
268.

Sw. POWER POOL, supra note 260, at 6.
ISOIRTO PLANNING COMM., supra note 258, at 10.
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sion owners in a region; or (6) a regional planning process. He explains
that each of these characterizations has validity, but none fully describes
them. 69
These various views of RTOs reinforce the way in which they crosscut the levels of government and integrate public and private actors,
which are crucial components of the governance challenges described in
Section I.A. RTOs play and have the potential to play important roles in
helping to overcome some of the federalism barriers to effective grid
transformation generally and integration of renewables in particular because of their hybridity. While they are certainly not perfect, and there is
much analysis of the benefits and limitations of their form and some of
their actions,7 0 RTOs help to create a bridge both vertically between the
federal and state governments and horizontally among their member
states. This bridging is an important step towards full authority over the
planning of wires that often cross multiple jurisdictional lines and to
avoid overlap and fragmentation in this planning process. RTOs receive
frequent orders from FERC, including, for example, recent directives for
interconnecting wind farms. 7' When RTOs propose changes to their tariffs in order to implement these orders, they engage in frequent back2 72
and-forth communications with FERC.
Member states, in turn, cooperate both through RTOs and associated institutions, such as the Organization of MISO states, to support or oppose the RTOs' proposed policy
changes in response to FERC orders.
MISO's DIR approach, in particular, which integrates wind into the
real-time electricity market run by the RTO, has been shaped by an interaction among MISO, FERC, and entities challenging MISO's approach. MISO formulated its particular approach under section 205 of
the Federal Power Act. Some regulated entities and groups representing
them then filed a challenge to aspects of the approach. FERC accepted
and rejected parts of the approach and then denied rehearing. 73 MISO's
hybrid, regional role in that process-as both a regulated and regulating
entity addressing regional concerns around wind integration-helped to
provide a new model for market integration.
To implement expanded transmission for anticipated future generation, SPP has relied on similar institutional mechanisms that integrate ac269.

Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 240, at 554-57.

270. For a summary of this debate, see id. at 578-91.
271. For a discussion of MISO's efforts to integrate wind, see Order Conditionally Accepting in
Part and Rejecting in Part Tariff Filing and Requiring Compliance Filings, supra note 257; Order
Denying Rehearing, supra note 257.
272. For an example of these dynamics, see Order Conditionally Accepting in Part and Rejecting
in Part Tariff Filing and Requiring Compliance Filings, supra note 257; Order Denying Rehearing,
supra note 257.
273. For a discussion of the orders establishing RTOs, see supra notes 242-46 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the process by which MISO established the DIR and challenges were made to
it, see Order Conditionally Accepting in Part and Rejecting in Part Tariff Filing and Requiring Compliance Filings, supra note 257; Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 257.
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tors from multiple levels. Through its "local area (sub-regional) planning
process" to address existing interconnection requests, for example, it
meets quarterly with stakeholders from SPP's geographic "subregions"
to discuss local needs and to hear any requests for high-priority transmission projects.2 74 This process helps facilitate agreement around transmission and communication about concerns.
Both the underlying RTO structure and RTOs' efforts to foster
transmission and market integration have begun to effectively address
gaps and overlap in authority, including questions of where each actor
falls within the decision making hierarchy for transmission planning and
the extent to which these actors cooperate and conflict. The MISO processes around transmission build-out and market integration create structured bidirectional hierarchy, for example, and the MVP and DIR approaches, discussed above, allow for iterative interactions among MISO
and FERC, MISO and stakeholders, and FERC and stakeholders. These
interactions sometimes involve conflict, even formal challenges raised
before FERC and federal courts. But the combination of these challenges with formal approval processes that allow for stakeholder input under
FERC and MISO have helped connect and coordinate the many actors
involved in expanding transmission to renewables. These processes,
through both bridging authority and locating it at a regional level, allow
for needed progress.
3.

Including Publicand PrivateActors in MultidirectionalPlanning
Processes

In addition to connecting several governance levels, RTOs also have
effectively integrated public and private stakeholders. The processes for
including these stakeholders are both bottom-up and top-down, thus balancing grassroots input with public review; this may help to avoid capture
of the process by any one actor. SPP, for example, which had to decide
on essential yet disparate plans for both existing grid interconnection requests and future transmission needs, developed an inclusive Balanced
Portfolio planning process.275 In 2009, the SPP Board of Directors
formed a new stakeholder planning group-the "Synergistic Planning
Project Team" (SPPT), consisting of electric cooperatives, state electricity regulators, utilities, capital groups, and SPP staff.276 This group proposed a plan to coordinate various local and regional planning processes,
and the plan has since been adopted by the SPP, which models needs for
likely future generation. 77 Under this plan, a number of SPP stakeholder
groups, such as those dealing with the allocation of transmission costs
across the region and environmental issues, propose the scenarios to be
274.
275.
276.
277.

Sw. POWER POOL, supranote 260, at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.

No. 1]

HYBRID ENERGY GOVERNANCE

used in the model, and stakeholders then approve them." s An SPP working group then finalizes development of the model and runs it, proposing
transmission solutions based on model results.279 The Board of Directors
ultimately approves the solutions generated by the Integrated Planning
Process following another stakeholder review.' Through the process,
stakeholders reach a consensus on how to ensure that benefits of new
transmission projects would be equally allocated throughout the region
and how costs would be transferred to match benefits, 281 and the Board of
Directors approves the resulting plan.
Together, MISO and SPP model the dynamic role that hybrid, regional entities are playing in addressing grid-related federalism challenges. They serve as an interface between national and state regulatory entities and a range of important private and quasi-private actors, and use
their role to attempt to overcome barriers to progress at state and federal
scales.
As with the previous two sets of examples, MISO and SPP efforts
are not unmitigated successes. Most fundamentally, their experiments
are young, and it is still unclear whether their transmission and market
efforts will actually achieve their goals or, in some instances, even survive
judicial review. Not all stakeholders buy in to their approaches, as evidenced, for example, by challenges to the DIR made through the FERC
regulatory process.m Moreover, as organizations with voluntary membership, RTOs cannot compel stakeholders to become members and participate. Even with these limitations, however, their innovative efforts to
make progress through a hybrid, inclusive structure at regional effort
represent an important example of possible ways forward.
VI. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL HYBRIDITY
The U.S. energy institutions described in the previous Part have
made admirable progress in the face of significant substantive and structural barriers. Facing the difficult tasks of updating an entire grid for reliability and clean energy while reducing risks in the extraction of fuels the lifeblood of the electricity generation system-these institutions are
grappling with the need to coordinate actors from all levels of governance, and, increasingly, thousands of stakeholders. Their practical efforts
suggest ways in which regional, hybrid institutions may play an important
role in future energy governance challenges.
In order to conduct a normative assessment of whether these innovations should be viewed as successful, this Part explores the broader
278. Id. at 9.
279. See id. at 10-14, 16 (describing the process testing models in twenty-year, ten-year and Near
Term Assessments).
280. See id. at 19.
281. See id. at 6.
282. See supra notes 262-63,279.
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patterns emerging from these examples drawn from diverse and at times
divergent areas of energy law. It assesses the benefits and limitations of
these types of governance innovations as a tool for energy transformation, with a focus on both policy and governance achievements. It begins by considering the difficulties of defining success and then turns to
an examination of their substantive and structural roles.
A.

Difficulties of Defining "Success"

To evaluate whether hybrid regional entities may successfully address future substantive energy challenges while overcoming governance
barriers, one must of course have a definition of success. But the dual
nature of our inquiry makes this definition more difficult to establish: we
are interested both in whether these institutions are making substantive
progress in addressing the need for energy transition and whether their
governance approach in achieving this progress is a constructive one.
The latter part of our inquiry also potentially raises long-standing philosophical debates about process-based versus ends-based evaluation of
success. While an involved exposition of deontology versus teleology, or
how to conduct utilitarian measurement, is beyond the scope of this paper, there is arguably value in having a better energy governance process
even if the outcomes remain the same.
Given this framing complexity, our assessment in this Part takes two
primary steps. First, we engage in a substantive inquiry that asks whether these institutions have made progress in addressing the three sets of
challenges we have identified. More simply put, have they helped
(1) make unconventional fuel extraction less risky, (2) improve grid reliability in the context of a transition to a smart grid, and (3) integrate renewables onto the physical grid and into the energy market?
This measure of success is designed to address the ends-based concerns of whether these types of governance innovations appear to be
helpful to achieving energy transition. Our assessment approach involves qualitative case studies rather than quantitative empirical methods. We acknowledge the value of future quantitative empirical work in
this area, but the goal of this Article is to provide a more nuanced exposition of several examples than quantitative analysis generally provides in
order to understand how and why governance innovation might translate
into substantive success in the energy system.
In addition to focusing on specific ends-based substantive goals of
energy transformation, this Part also considers a second measure of success: whether these governance innovations actually embody the three
principles for more effective governance introduced in Dynamic Energy
Federalism. As explored in depth in that piece, we have core concerns
with the energy system's complexity and with its silos. We have proposed that more dynamic, holistic treatment of interlinked federalism
and governance relationships in the energy system would benefit the system as a whole and specifically, that a dynamic energy federalism model
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must draw together actors from all governance levels affected by or involved in energy changes, better integrate these actors, and allow for enhanced levels of private entity involvement accompanied by stakeholder
participation and other mechanisms to lower the risk of inefficient capture.
In arguing for this governance system, we acknowledge the difficulties of achieving foundational changes to underlying statutes and regulatory approaches, particularly in the current political climate. These hybrid, regional structures have promise in part because they may have the
capacity to produce more effective governance without major reform.
We therefore also conduct a structural assessment of success based on
our case examples in order to determine whether these institutional innovations can fill gaps in authority, reduce fragmentation, and integrate
key public and private stakeholders without capture.
B.

Substantive Assessment

Substantively, as described in the case examples of Parts III through
V, regional hybrid institutions have made some meaningful progress toward addressing all three modern energy challenges that are the focus of
this Article. In the process, they appear in some instances to have
made-and to have the potential to make-energy cheaper, fairer, and
cleaner. None of these institutions has achieved unmitigated success,
though, and much room for progress remains. In each example, substantial structural barriers have sometimes limited their achievements and
may continue to do so. Moreover, the newness of some of these regulatory experiments means that their effectiveness has not been fully tested.
In the area of controlling the risks of unconventional fuel development, RCACs identify the many risks of oil spills through a relatively
comprehensive approach, including both monitoring and the proposal of
substantive mechanisms to prevent and respond to risk; this, in turn, may
ensure better environmental protection. By drawing in diverse stakeholders, they also prevent an assessment of risks through one lens, which
could miss the powerful effects of spills on certain populationsparticularly on communities that rely on ocean resources for their subsistence. This will potentially reduce unfair burdens on disadvantaged
groups in future spills, and it also enhances the inclusiveness of the process. Further, these councils do not appear to have imposed high costs on
energy development, although perhaps their focus on "recommendations" and monitoring, as opposed to extensive substantive action, places
too high of a premium on development over environmental protection.
It also remains unclear how successfully this model could be
brought into the context of deepwater drilling. RCACs have not yet
been established in the Gulf region despite the many calls for such an
approach in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. If they
were, their structure and goals would likely need to be much more complex than the current RCACs in the Alaskan context; the Gulf and its
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communities are far less environmentally pristine and far more populated than the region where the Exxon Valdez spill took place. The steps
that these two RCACs have been able to take and the assessments of
their progress thus far suggest, however, that they have the ability to
complement other regulatory processes and reduce the risks of oil
spills.,,
In unconventional onshore natural gas extraction, hybrid regional
entities have been more involved in attempting to directly regulate multiple aspects of drilling and fracturing. As introduced in Part III, the
Delaware River Basin Commission- composed of state representatives
and one federal representative --proposed to control the nonpoint source
pollution from well pads, require baseline testing of waters for pollutants
prior to drilling and fracturing, extensively regulate water withdrawals,
and approve the means and location of disposing of drilling and fracturing waste, for example; these measures would have provided relatively
comprehensive and direct control of risks."
Despite its progress in navigating the complex governance interactions that occur along horizontal and vertical axes, the institution's regulations may ultimately fail. The DRBC's own member states have engaged in increasingly conflictual, noncooperative relationships with it,
arguing that the regulations inadequately protect against environmental
risks .85 Furthermore, the DRBC regulations, if finalized, would cover
only water quantity and quality risks. Fragmented and divergent state
and local regulations would have to fill in the remaining problem areas,
and, if recent trends continue, 286 they would not be wholly successful in
this task.
Moving from governance of the risky extraction of fuel used in
power plants to electricity generation itself, NERC, as a hyperregional
institution (a collective of regional entities, which are collectives of
states) and a hybrid with numerous public and private actors, appears to
have achieved reasonable success in enhancing grid reliability despite
widespread computerizing of the grid and structures attached to the grid.
FERC has approved new cybersecurity standards proposed by NERC,28
and a number of utilities have taken important new cybersecurity
measures.
283.
284.
285.

See supra Part III.
See Revised Draft of Natural Gas Development Regulations, supra note 78, at 47-84.
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287. See, e.g., Version 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards, 139 FERC 1
61,058 (Apr. 19,2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 40).
288. See generally MILES KEOGH & CHRISTINA CODY, CYBERSECURITY FOR STATE
REGULATORS 5 (2012), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/NARUC%2OCybersecurity
%20for%2OState%2ORegulators%2OPrimer%20-%20June%202012.pdf (suggesting states are "ia-
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But as in the example of the risks associated with unconventional
fuels, significant concerns remain. According to some consultants, many
utilities still are at risk of computing-related interruptions,, 9 and the implementation of cyber-security measures will be costly;2" it is not entirely
clear whether the costs exceed the benefits of avoiding disruptions from
computerized attacks or other interruptions. Furthermore, some critics
have suggested that small utilities have not been diligent in implementing
cybersecurity measures; 291 in some regions, this could mean that customers that already face disadvantages due to limited access to diverse and
cheap generation could experience additional reliability problems in the
event of computer failures. Overall, NERC's success in preventing most
massive blackouts despite an aging infrastructure and a multiplicity of
new demands on the grid speaks to its general success, 292 but additional
implementation and testing over time is needed to assess the ultimate
success of its efforts to adapt reliability approaches to changing technology.
RTOs' efforts to integrate renewables onto the grid have thus far
been the most clearly successful of our examples, but they are at early
stages of implementation, making their long-term achievements still unclear. For example, MISO's transmission planning process that prioritizes projects with MVP designation has tremendous promise and is functioning well thus far. As Alex Klass and Elizabeth Wilson observe:
FERC approved the MVP model in December 2010 and the MISO
Board approved the projects in December 2011. The pricing model
allows regionally oriented projects to have their costs allocated
across the MISO region on a "postage-stamp" (load-ratio share)
basis. To be considered for MVP status, a proposed project either
must: (1) be developed through MISO's transmission expansion
planning process for the purpose of meeting various energy policy
laws or mandates; (2) provide multiple economic benefits to multiplementing energy assurance plans across the country that help respond to vulnerabilities, as well as
preventing and protecting against threats").
289. See Cyber Security Measures a Must for All Utilities, Expert Tells Seattle Gathering, PUBLIC
POWER WEEKLY (June 25, 2012), http://www.naylornetwork.com/app-ppw/articles/index-v2.
asp?aid=180746&issuelD=23334 ("Many public power utilities run enterprise and operations programs on a single flat network, he said. Those computer systems should be run on separate networks-one for enterprise (billing, engineering, desktop users) and one for operations (substation,
SCADA, metering, distribution, generation and transmission).").
290. See generally KEOGH & CODY, supra note 288, at 12-13 (noting that "in the face of shrinking
budgets, fluctuating workforce and the absence of comprehensive legislation, regulators need a dynamic strategy to strike the right balance of security and resources" and that "regulators must keep the
cost of electricity affordable for customers while asking utilities to spend more on cybersecurity in the
face of increasing media attention on stories of cybersecurity threats").
291. See Cyber Security Measures a Must for All Utilities, Expert Tells Seattle Gathering, supra
note 289 (suggesting that small utilities may view the cybersecurity standards as being important only
for large utilities).
292.

Cf. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILrrY CORP., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2013), available at http://

www.nerc.com/files/NERC%202012%2OAnnual%2OReport%20%28MAR13%29.pdf (concluding in
a self-assessment that "[r]eliability of the bulk power system remains adequate with little change in
trends between 2008 and 2011" but noting some significant reliability issues).
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pie regions, while the project's total economic benefits are greater
than the total economic costs; or (3) address an issue related to a
regional reliability standard, while the project's total economic benefits are greater than the total economic costs. In creating a new
cost allocation methodology for MVP projects, "Midwest ISO projects that the MVP starter projects developed within the first five to
ten years following approval of the proposed MVP cost allocation
methodology will generate between $400 million to $1.3 billion in
spread almost
aggregate annual adjusted production cost savings,
29 3
evenly across all Midwest ISO Planning Regions.
This process, while efficient, has addressed important environmental values in its expansion of transmission access for renewables, and also
has focused directly on fairness in its requirement that the projects provide benefits to "multiple regions.12 94 Further, the process to implement
the MVP involved multiple public meetings with options for stakeholder
input.295 Until these lines actually are built and in operation, however, we
cannot know with certainty how much progress this program will make in
bringing renewable sources onto the grid.
Similarly, MISO has successfully implemented its DIR approach, after revising it somewhat over the course of the FERC regulatory process.
As a result, wind producers have begun to participate in the real-time
energy market for the first time. Because this implementation has occurred over the last several months, though, it is still too early to know
how effectively this market mechanism will reduce wind curtailment over
time (instances when wind producers cannot put all of their available
wind onto the grid). As of now, the DIR program's main accomplishment has been to create fuller market participation, an important gain.
These rather mixed substantive results provide a window into both
the benefits and limitations of these kinds of governance experiments as
a tool in energy transition. On the one hand, these hybrid, regional institutions have made some progress in addressing substantive challenges.
They each have developed new regulatory standards and approaches in
rapidly-evolving areas of the energy system; such efforts are needed to
help the system be responsive to change. On the other hand, these examples contain many instances of groups of dissatisfied stakeholders and
of proposals that never solidified. Considering these concerns and preliminary progress, we are guardedly optimistic that this governance innovation has the capacity to translate into needed regulatory innovation.

293. Klass & Wilson, supra note 251, at 1851-52.
294. Id. at 1852.
295. Candidate MVP Portfolio Study, MISO, https://www.midwestiso.orglPlanning/Pagesl
MVPAnalysis.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) ("High-level study updates were provided at the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC), Planning Subcommittee (PS) and the Subregional Planning Meetings (SPMs). Candidate MVP Technical Study Task Force (TSTF) meetings were also held throughout the study on at least a monthly basis. Finally, weekly updates were sent to stakeholders via the
Planning Advisory Committee (PAC) mailing list.").

No. 1]

HYBRID ENERGY GOVERNANCE

C. StructuralAssessment
Our structural assessment parallels the substantive one and is closely intertwined with it. All of the institutions described in this Article represent significant steps towards our recommended governance principles,
and these innovations appear to be important contributors to the substantive gains that they have made thus far. None of these institutions,
however, has completely solved the governance problems we identified
in Dynamic Energy Federalism. Gaps in authority and fragmented authority remain, and often serve as important barriers to these institutions
achieving their regulatory goals. These institutions' integration of private actors has also had naysayers from both directions, including those
who think that some important private interests have not been wellenough incorporated and those that think private interests have been too
well incorporated. Despite these limitations, and at times perhaps because of them, these institutions serve as important examples of the types
of governance innovations that could play a central role in supporting
energy transitions toward less risky fuel extraction, grid reliability, and
more renewables. This Section uses the three governance principles to
explore these issues.
First, all of these hybrid arrangements establish significant authority
at a regional level, which helps to address some of the gaps in authority
in the relevant substantive areas. In the hydraulic fracturing and oil spills
context, this regional focus allows RCACs and groups operating under
interstate compacts, such as the DRBC, to address geographically intertwined concerns with key stakeholders involved. The NERC regional
entities similarly convene regional interests and conduct enforcement at
that level; because one grid outage can affect an entire region, and the
grid is increasingly interconnected as a result of new technologies, regionalism serves as a critical interstitial space. Likewise, regional-level
authority allows the RTOs to convene sometimes conflicting stakeholders and bridge state and national-level authority gaps around allocating
cost for new transmission lines and integrating more intermittent sources
into price structures.
As noted in the above analysis, this gap-filling is not comprehensive.
These regional-level institutions do not supplant the partial authority of
the relevant federal, state, and local governments; they are limited to using their powers to create additional, umbrella-type authority at a regional level that can create needed convergence. As a consequence of
this limited authority, these institutions face many checks and hurdles as
they attempt to achieve their goals. This partial gap-filling suggests that
regional hybrid approaches can help ameliorate the problem of inadequate authority without requiring major legal or institutional reform, but
cannot fully solve it.
Second, with respect to the problem of simultaneous overlap and
fragmentation, each of these institutions integrates multiple governance
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levels into their processes with possibilities for bottom-up input. All of
these structures help to resolve questions of hierarchy through their inclusive processes. For example, both the DRBC and RCAC involve high
levels of stakeholder participation and include governmental and nongovernmental entities constituted at different scales within that stakeholder group. Similarly, NERC and RTOs conduct processes that allow
both individual end users and utilities significant opportunities for input.
This type of overlap can be highly beneficial when well-coordinated, as
Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have observed. It may reduce the costs of
decision making by, for example, "streamlining redundant functions" like
information gathering. 296 Further, it may lower the costs to stakeholders
and encourage the pooling of
of participating in the regulatory process
297
agency expertise, among other benefits.
These institutions and their fit within broader regulatory structures
also provide opportunities for iterative conflict and cooperation. After
states were upset with the DRBC process, for example, it began holding
more meetings to try to achieve a compromise. 29 The RCACs similarly
try to find common ground among disparate groups and address areas
where disagreement persists. When FERC reviews and criticizes regulatory decisions by NERC and RTOs or stakeholders challenge them,
those entities respond, often with modifications.
As with the first principle of progress toward substantive energy
goals, these institutions' governance successes are only partial. By bringing key stakeholders together, they decrease overlap and fragmentation
and provide opportunities for coordinated action. Because significant
fragmented authority remains at multiple levels of government, however,
they cannot achieve full integration. From a normative perspective, this
state of affairs may at times be positive. After all, the U.S. system of
government, with its separation of power, checks and balances, and federalist structure, is founded on the idea that too much consolidation of
authority can lead to problematic institutions and outcomes. Along
these lines, some of the dissent in the examples may lead to better policies; if for example, the DRBC's standards do not provide enough environmental protection, the state opposition may help to prevent the
emergence of a regulatory scheme that allows risky gas development
practices. To the extent that the remaining fragmentation results in regulatory dysfunction, though, the current level of integration of authority
may still be inadequate.
Finally, these entities have a high level of public and private integration. Industry representatives participate in RCACs, which receive funding from two major corporations. State members of the DRBC also re296. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 36, at 1182.
297. See id. at 1183-85.
298. See generally COLLIER, supra note 96, at 1 (suggesting that the DRBC sustains a cooperative
climate).
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ceive industry input through an industry-nonprofit group called the State
Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations" and indirectly from DOE advisory committees, which publish recommendations
for improved fracturing regulation.3 °° Further, NERC's approach provides for utility and electricity end user participation and a private governance structure. Utilities also have a high level of involvement in RTO
decisions, and RTOs are themselves nonprofit boards. 1
Despite progress in integrating private entities within the energy
governance schemes discussed here, it is often unclear if their mechanism
for structuring public-private integration is optimal. Commentators, for
example, have raised concerns about capture by interested corporations
in multiple instances, and some of their proposals for further reform
could improve these institutions. For instance, Plater's critiques regarding RCACs reliance on interested corporations for funding and cooptation of their board members suggest further strategies needed to prevent
capture;3°2 RCAC funding could be restructured so that a more independent entity allocates the money, and more oversight of board members could take place. Although issues of potential capture cannot be
fully eliminated so long as valuable private party inclusion occurs-and
additional structures to ensure independence can create structural inefficiencies and reduce effectiveness-continued reassessment of these institutions' approach to private integration seems critical.
As in our substantive assessment, we are cautiously optimistic about
the governance innovations seen within the institutions analyzed in this
Article as a strategy for better governance approaches across energy law.
These institutions are not panaceas, and our case examples reveal many
limitations of hybrid regionalism, even in substantive contexts where the
underlying geography of the problem lends itself to regionally-based approaches. Regional-level entities at times cannot fully address issues that
occur primarily at state and federal scales. Multilevel, iterative processes
are messy and do not always reach conclusions that satisfy all stakeholders. Public-private hybrids must always be alert to concerns about industry capture. In addition, because these institutions and their innovations
often emerge from crisis, their approaches may at times be hard to replicate in other contexts without the regulatory push that crisis brings.
Even with these limitations, the institutions discussed in this Article
serve as an important model for the road ahead. They demonstrate the
possibilities for hybrid, regional institutions to address the physical and
299. Past Reviews, STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews (last visited Oct. 28, 2013)
(showing that the organization has completed reviews of hydraulic fracturing regulations in six states).
300. See, e.g., SEC. OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, SHALE GAS
PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY REPORT (2011), available at http://www.shalegas.energy.

gov/resources/081811_90 day-report-final.pdf.
301. See Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC 61,285 (1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (noting that "Commission-approved ISOs operate, or propose to operate, as
non-profit organizations" and include "both public and non-public utility members").
302. See Plater, supra note 106, at 660.
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governance-based complexity of the energy system in a principled fashion as our institutions strive to respond to substantive energy challenges.
VII.CONCLUSION

We are still far from achieving needed energy transformation in the
United States. Part of this Article's goal has been to explain why such
change is hard and what it would take to get there. As we observe in
Dynamic Energy Federalism, we cannot solve our modern energy problems without grounding governance approaches in an understanding of
federalism that acknowledges and embraces the underlying complexity of
the system. Simple solutions that involve empowering one key actor at
one level of government are unlikely to work without massive -and likely politically impossible -reform of the law applicable to energy at multiple levels of government.
This reality does not mean, though, that the goal of energy transformation is impossible. This Article provides case examples of dynamic,
hybrid entities to show how institutions can be structured to navigate the
governance challenges arising from complexity. The institutions described here offer limited examples of a much broader set of energy governance institutions, omitting, for example, state energy siting boards
that draw together municipalities and state agencies in streamlined processes 30 3 and interagency coordination to address offshore wind development. 311 They provide, though, a taste of the extent to which integrating
actors from several governance levels, coordinating regional approaches
among these governance levels, and enabling unique interactions between actors -including public-private cooperation -offers promise for
future energy transitions. Their method of approaching our complex energy system, and the resulting gains and pitfalls, can assist future efforts
in these contexts and others to structure needed innovation.
Specifically, as analyzed in Part VI, the entities studied in this Article embody our proposed principles for effective governance in several
ways that could be replicated in many other substantive areas of energy
law and beyond. First, they focus around an interstitial governance level-in all of these cases the regional level between state and federal.
This "in-between" scaling allows them to more effectively navigate the
303.

See,

e.g.,

ENERGY

FACILITY

SITE

EVALUATION

COUNCIL,

http://www.efsec.wa.gov/

default.shtm (last visited Oct. 28, 2013); see also generally Hannah J. Wiseman, Expanding Regional
Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2011) (discussing these and other unique regional institutions).
304. See, e.g., Secretary Salazar Announces Approval of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf of Massachusetts, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/
doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-Cape-wind-Energy-Project-on-OuterContinental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm (describing negotiation between the Dept. of the Interior and
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, Cape Wind Energy Project:
Final Environmental Impact Statement, OCS Pub. No. 2008-040 (describing review and input in the
approval process by the Dept. of the Interior, the Coast Guard, the National Marine Fisheries Service,
and other agencies).
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fragmented and inadequate authority in the key levels above and below.
Second, they do not simply attempt to create new governance authority
at that level, but also use their regional scaling to help combine existing
authority at multiple levels. They include key stakeholders in those interactions, including those who lack top-down authority. Finally, they
incorporate all key stakeholders, not just governmental ones. Their inclusion of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals
in formal processes helps governance reflect the underlying relational
dynamics more effectively and often makes the difficulty of navigating
capture concerns worthwhile.
Combining the governance model offered in Dynamic Energy Federalism and this Article's practical applications of this model to modern
energy challenges will provide important lessons for institutions moving
forward; indeed, hybrid regional institutions, as opposed to unilateral
state or federal approaches to energy issues, likely should be the new
norm in energy governance. Not all institutions will need to be regional
as they attempt to integrate these principles; all of the energy challenges
that were the focus of this Article, from the reliability and expansion of
the transmission grid to drilling gas wells in watersheds and oil wells offshore, had clearly regional impacts and implicated a range of actors.
Certain energy issues will be more compact both in their effects and their
planning demands; distributed generation such as solar panels on roofs,
for instance, may require primarily local zoning governance. 05 But even
in those cases, some multilevel interaction takes place, which could make
some variation among these governance approaches valuable. For example, distributed generation has system-wide impacts; if the majority of
residents in a neighborhood installed solar panels or wind turbines in
backyards, they could potentially exceed the local capacity of the grid, or
could-if policy allowed-join forces to form a larger generating unit
that affected the larger transmission grid.st1
Similarly, public-private integration should take a variety of forms
depending on the energy issue addressed. Many institutions will not
need the level of private involvement that, for example, NERC requires.
Whereas utilities are necessary players in a governance regime that
writes and enforces highly technical standards for the reliability of the
grid, governmental actors may have sufficient knowledge of, say, certain
risks of oil and gas extraction to do most of the governing themselves.
There, too, though, exist detailed and long-tested industry standards, and
as technologies for unconventional extraction rapidly change, industry
may hold most of the key knowledge of risks; the aftermath of the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill reinforces the difficulties that superior industry information and access, paired with regulations that struggle to keep
305. See, e.g., Garrick Pursley & Hannah Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877 (2011) (arguing for local governance of distributed energy installation above a federal floor).
306. See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547,
571-72 (2011) (describing opportunities for microgrids and policy needs),
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up with technology, can provide for regulators attempting to respond appropriately. Each regime will have to weigh these and other questions,
examining the need for cross-cutting regional governance, industry involvement, and enhanced stakeholder participation in that setting.
The governance experiments described in this Article do not immediately solve all challenges by virtue of their innovations. As each of
their stories reflects, these institutions all have faced and continue to face
obstacles, and they arguably each have an uphill battle in achieving
needed substantive change. But even with these difficulties, they help
provide hope and a way forward. They demonstrate the possibilities for
operationalizing needed dynamism in the complex energy system and the
transformation that can result from doing so.

